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A DYNKIN GAME ON ASSETS WITH INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION ON THE RETURN
TIZIANO DE ANGELIS, FABIEN GENSBITTEL, STE´PHANE VILLENEUVE
Abstract. This paper studies a 2-players zero-sum Dynkin game arising from pricing
an option on an asset whose rate of return is unknown to both players. Using filtering
techniques we first reduce the problem to a zero-sum Dynkin game on a bi-dimensional
diffusion (X,Y ). Then we characterize the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies in which each player stops at the hitting time of (X,Y ) to a set with moving
boundary. A detailed description of the stopping sets for the two players is provided
along with global C1 regularity of the value function.
1. Introduction
Zero-sum optimal stopping games (Dynkin games) have received a lot of attention
since the seminal paper by Dynkin [13], see also the classical references [2] and [27].
In particular, these games have found applications in mathematical finance where the
arbitrage-free pricing of American options with early cancellation (game options) relies
on the computation of the value of a zero-sum game of optimal stopping between the
buyer and the seller (see [24],[26]). A common assumption in the financial application
of Dynkin games is that the players have complete information about the parameters
of the underlying stochastic process. In practice, however, there are many situations in
which parameters are difficult to estimate and in particular this is true for the drift of
the process.
Our work is inspired by the real option literature, where the value of an investment
(like the beginning of the extraction of a natural resource or the investment in a R&D
programme) is a contingent asset, depending on the price S of some underlying asset,
and it is computed by using arbitrage arguments (see [12]). It is known that the prob-
lem itself boils down to an optimal timing decision, hence optimal stopping is the key
mathematical tool. Following [12], we assume that the price process evolves according
to a geometric Brownian motion
dSt
St
= µdt+ σdBt
where µ is the log-return on the so-called risk-adjusted asset price.
The capital asset pricing model allows us to determine the risk-adjusted discount
rate r which is used to discount future cashflows (notice that this is in general larger
than the risk-free rate, see, e.g., [12, p. 178]). In line with [12] we assume µ ≤ r and
denote the difference r − µ by δ0. The condition µ ≤ r avoids that the value of an
investment project whose payoff is linear in S becomes unbounded (which would lead
the investor to delay the investment forever). It is known that estimating the return of
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the risk-adjusted price of an asset is a challenging task and we embed this feature in
our model by considering an asset with a partially unobservable drift µ.
A typical problem that we have in mind is the one of a firm holding a concession to drill
oil wells. Being aware of the social costs and benefits of the oil field development, a public
authority would like to sign a contract where the concession rights can be cancelled at
any time, pending the payment of a contractual penalty. From the investor’s point of
view (and simplifying the model for the benefit of tractability) the decision to invest
would be profitable only if the value of the underlying commodity can compensate for
the fixed cost of investment K > 0. In this sense one can interpret the option to invest
as a Call option on the price of the commodity, with strike equal to K. A cancellation
of the agreement would require a payment equal to the Call payoff plus a penalty (i.e.,
to compensate for the lost investment opportunity).
Motivated by the above considerations, in this paper we study zero-sum optimal
stopping games with incomplete information about the return of the underlying asset.
We are interested in the existence of the value as well the existence and characterization
of Nash equilibria for the game. To enable a detailed theoretical analysis, we shall keep
the real option model simple while, at the same time, drawing from the vast literature
on Israeli options (initiated by [24]).
We assume that the buyer (player 1) and the seller (player 2) of a Call option on an
asset S agree on a constant risk-adjusted discount rate r > 0, which is used to discount
future payoffs in the game (i.e., we assume that players have the same belief on the
future of the economy). Moreover we model the uncertainty on the the asset return
by assuming that the adjusted log-return is random and only partially observable. To
avoid confusion with the previously introduced notation we denote it by µ˜ (as opposed
to µ in the previous page). In particular we assume µ˜ = r − δ0D, where δ0 > 0 is a
constant and D ∈ {0, 1} is random and unobservable to the players.
Our choice for µ˜ ties up nicely with the usual concept of net return on a stock paying
dividends at a rate δ0D. Although other choices for µ˜ are clearly possible, we shall see
below that this basic model already poses significant mathematical challenges. To the
best of our knowledge this is the first paper addressing a zero-sum game with partial
information via a probabilistic analysis of the related free boundary problem, hence we
leave other parameter choices for future work.
The asset in our model evolves, on a probability space (Ω,F ,P), according to
dSt = (r − δ0D)Stdt+ σStdBt, S0 = x > 0,(1.1)
where (Bt)t≥0 is a Brownian motion and σ > 0 is the volatility. The random variable
D takes the values 0 or 1 with P(D = 1) = y and it is assumed to be independent of
(Bt)t≥0. We denote by FS := (FS)t≥0 the filtration generated by the observed process
S and by FS := (FS)t≥0 its augmentation with P-null sets (see further details in Section
2). Then we define by T S the set of FS-stopping times.
In our game we fix K > 0 and ε0 > 0 and let
G1(x) := (x−K)+, G2(x) := (x−K)+ + ε0(1.2)
be the payoff for player 1 (the option holder) and the cost of cancellation for player
2 (the seller), respectively. Then the formulation of our game is the following: the
expected discounted payoff of the game is
(1.3) Mx,y(τ, γ) = E[e−rτG1(Sτ )1{τ≤γ} + e−rγG2(Sγ)1{γ<τ}]
where τ, γ ∈ T S . In particular the option holder picks τ , in order to exercise the option,
and the seller picks γ, in order to cancel it. The holder aims at maximising her revenue
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while the seller wants to minimise costs. By convention, we set
e−rτG1(Sτ )1{τ=∞} = e−rγG2(Sγ)1{γ=∞} = 0, P− a.s.
The notation Mx,y accounts for the dependence of the stopping functional on the
initial asset value and on the a-priori probability of the event {D = 1}. This notation
will be fully justified and explained in Section 2 below.
As usual we define the upper value and the lower value of the stopping game, respec-
tively by
V (x, y) = inf
γ
sup
τ
Mx,y(τ, γ) and V (x, y) = sup
τ
inf
γ
Mx,y(τ, γ).(1.4)
When V (x, y) = V (x, y), the game has a value V (x, y) := V (x, y) = V (x, y). Moreover,
if there exist two stopping times (τ∗, γ∗) such that
Mx,y(τ, γ∗) ≤Mx,y(τ∗, γ∗) ≤Mx,y(τ∗, γ)
for all stopping times τ and γ, the pair (τ∗, γ∗) is a saddle point or a Nash equilibrium
for the optimal stopping game and in that case the game has a value with V (x, y) =
Mx,y(τ∗, γ∗).
In the context of Israeli options one has P(D = 1) = 1 or P(D = 1) = 0 (the non-
dividend case). Explicit computations have been established by [17] and [35] in the
perpetual case. Both papers show that the dividend parameter δ0 plays an important
role for the existence of an equilibrium in the game and this will be the case also in the
present work.
We recall now some results from the existing literature so that we can later dis-
cuss the mathematical novelty of our work. The existence of the value for optimal
stopping games with multi-dimensional Markov processes was proved in [16] using mar-
tingale methods and by Bensoussan and Friedman [2] via variational inequalities. These
methods require suitable integrability of the payoff processes, i.e., in our notation, the
processes e−rtGi(St), i = 1, 2 must be uniformly integrable. When such condition is
not fulfilled, the existence of the value was proven in [17] but only for one-dimensional
diffusions. Results in [17] rely upon a generalized type of concavity introduced in [14]
and brought up to date in [7].
On the other hand sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in Mar-
kovian setting have been studied in [16] and [17]. For a rather general class of Markov
processes these conditions include the above mentioned uniform integrability of the pay-
off processes. In the special case of one-dimensional diffusions weaker integrability may
instead be sufficient (see [17], Proposition 4.3).
In our setting we are faced with two main technical difficulties in establishing existence
of the value and of a Nash equilibrium: (i) the process S is not Markovian and (ii) it
fails to fulfil the condition of uniform integrability (see Remark 2.1), in particular for
any initial condition S0 = x ∈ R+ we have
(1.5) E
(
sup
0≤t<∞
e−rtGi(St)
)
= +∞, i = 1, 2.
To overcome the first difficulty we rely upon filtering theory and increase the di-
mension of our state space. Informally we could say that we take into account the
progressive update of the players’ estimate on D, based on the observation of S. This
approach leads us to study a two dimensional Markovian system which we denote by
(Xt, Yt)t≥0, where (at least formally) X = S and Yt = E[D|FSt ]. On the other hand, to
tackle the lack of uniform integrability and prove the existence of the value of the game,
we adapt methods developed by Lepeltier-Maingueneau [27] and Ekstrom-Peskir [16].
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After we prove existence of the value, we are then in the position to carry out a
detailed analysis of the structure of the stopping sets for the two players, i.e. the sub-
sets of the state space in which V = Gi, i = 1, 2. Denoting Si := {V = Gi}, i = 1, 2
we study properties of the boundaries of S1 and S2 which we subsequently use to state
conditions for the existence of a saddle point (Nash equilibrium). The latter is provided
in terms of hitting times to S1 and S2.
In our analysis we use two equivalent representations of the two-dimensional dynam-
ics. These are linked to one another by a deterministic transformation – the so-called
reduction of second order PDEs to normal form (observe that a similar transformation
was already used by several papers like [11],[15] and [20] among others). Indeed we
first observe that the process (Xt, Yt) is driven by only one Brownian motion and it is
therefore degenerate; then we perform a change of coordinates to obtain a new process
(Zt, Yt). Here Zt is deterministic and either increasing or decreasing, depending on the
choice of parameters in the problem. Effectively the process Z plays the role of a ‘time’
process.
We would like to emphasize that the probabilistic study of free boundary problems
related to zero-sum Dynkin games on two dimensional diffusions has not received much
attention so far. Works in this direction but in a parabolic setting are [9] and [35].
Our analysis here goes beyond results in those papers by showing for example that
the value of the game is a globally C1 function of the state variables (x, y). This type
of regularity is much stronger than the well-known smooth-fit, which gives continuity
of one directional derivative with respect to one state variable. Related work on C1
regularity is contained in [10], which however does not cover our game setting.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we specify the model and provide
a Markovian formulation of the zero-sum game. Existence and continuity of the value
for the game (1.3) is obtained in Section 3. The geometry of the stopping sets is
obtained in Section 4, in the (x, y)-plane, and in Section 5, in the (z, y)-plane (parabolic
formulation). Hitting times to those sets are used in Section 6 to prove higher regularity
of the value, e.g. its global C1 regularity, and in Section 7 we obtain sufficient conditions
for the existence of a saddle point. Finally, in Section 8 we collect some concluding
remarks and discuss possible directions for further research. A few technical results are
given in Appendix.
2. Dynamics of the underlying asset
We begin by considering the probability space Ω0 = C([0 +∞),R)× {0, 1} endowed
with a sigma algebra F0 and the product probability P0y = W ⊗ pi(y) where W is the
standard Wiener measure and pi(y) = (1− y, y). Let us denote ((Bt)t≥0, D) a canonical
element of Ω0 and let r > 0, δ0 > 0 and σ > 0 be fixed. Then the asset’s value (with
uncertain return rate) which is described by (1.1) has an explicit expression in terms of
the couple (B,D), i.e.
(2.1) Sxt = xe
σBt+(r−δ0D)t− tσ22
The process Sx is a geometric Brownian motion whose drift parameter depends on
the unobservable random variable D. We recall that the latter is independent of the
Brownian motion B. As discussed in the introduction a technical difficulty arising in
our model is the lack of uniform integrability of the process Sx.
Remark 2.1. If y ∈ (0, 1), the process e−rtSxt is not uniformly integrable because
limt→+∞e−rtSxt = limt→+∞xe
σBt− tσ22
(
1{D=0} + 1{D=1}e−δ0t
)
= 0, P0y − a.s.,
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whereas
limt→+∞E0y[e−rtSxt ] = (1− y)x.
Hence, by linearity of the payoffs Gi, i = 1, 2 in (1.2) we obtain (1.5).
We aim at giving a rigorous formulation for the game call option (1.3). One way
to do it is to replace P and (St)t≥0 in (1.3) by P0y and (Sxt )t≥0 defined above. Let
FS := (FS)t≥0 be the filtration generated by Sx and FS := (FS)t≥0 be its augmen-
tation with P0y-null sets. Then we denote T S the set of FS-stopping times and the
optimisation is taken over stopping times (τ, γ) ∈ T S . The disadvantage of this formu-
lation is that the dynamics of Sx is not Markovian and therefore for the solution of the
problem we cannot rely upon free boundary methods. To overcome this difficulty we
want to reduce our problem to a Markovian framework by using filtering techniques.
According to [1, Thm. 2.35, p. 40] the filtration FS := (FS)t≥0 is right continuous
and therefore satisfies the usual assumptions. Thus, we define the process (Dyt )t≥0 as an
FS-ca`dla`g version of the martingale (E0y[D|FSt ])t≥0. Notice that (Dyt )t≥0 is a bounded
martingale that converges almost surely to D. The latter is FS∞-measurable because
1
t
ln(Sxt ) =
1
t
[
ln(x) + (σBt − tσ
2
2
)− δ0t1{D=1}
]
−→
t→∞
σ2
2
− δ01{D=1}.
According to Chapter 9 in Liptser-Shiryaev [28] (see also Chapter 4.2 in Shiryaev
[34]), the process (Sx, Dy) is the unique strong solution to the following SDE,{
dSxt = (r − δ0Dyt )Sxt dt+ σSxt dŴt
dDyt = − δ0σ Dyt (1−Dyt )dŴt
(2.2)
where
Ŵt =
1
σ
(∫ t
0
(Sxu)
−1dSxu −
∫ t
0
(r − δ0Dyu)du
)
is an FS-adapted Brownian motion under P0y. The couple (Sx, Dy) is therefore adapted
to the augmentation of the filtration generated by Ŵ , which we denote by FŴ . This
implies in particular FS ⊆ FŴ and FŴ = FS because Ŵ is FS-adapted. Notice also
that the process (Dyt )t≥0 is adapted to the filtration FS by construction, so that it is
no surprise that the new Brownian motion Ŵ is also adapted to FS .
Above we have obtained (Sx, Dy) on the space (Ω0,F0,P0y) which depends on the
probability distribution of the random variable D. We prefer to get rid of such depen-
dence and consider another process (Xt, Yt)t≥0, having the same law than (Sxt , D
y
t )t≥0,
but defined below on a new probability space.
Take a probability space (Ω,F ,P), denote by W := (Wt)t≥0 a Brownian motion on
this space and by F := (Ft)t≥0 the augmentation of the filtration that it generates. For
(x, y) ∈ R+× (0, 1), let (X,Y ) be the unique strong solution of the bi-dimensional SDE{
dXt = (r − δ0Yt)Xtdt+ σXtdWt, X0 = x,
dYt = − δ0σ Yt(1− Yt)dWt, Y0 = y.
(2.3)
To keep track of the initial point we use the notation (Xx,y, Y y) and notice that by
standard theory (t, x, y) 7→ (Xx,yt , Y yt ) is indeed continuous P-almost surely. Notice also
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that the second equation is independent of the first one and therefore its solution, Y y,
is independent of x.
Since the processes {(Ω,F ,F,P), (Xx,y, Y y)} and {(Ω0,F0,FŴ ,P0y), (Sx, Dy)} have
the same law then the game option is more conveniently formulated using the former
since it is Markovian and the probability measure is independent of y. This will be done
in the next section.
Often in what follows we use the notation Px,y( · ) = P( · |X0 = x, Y0 = y) and drop
the apex in the couple (X,Y ). Before closing the section we notice that for all t ≥ 0
Xx,yt = x exp
(∫ t
0
(r − δ0Y ys −
σ2
2
) ds+ σWt
)
, P− a.s.(2.4)
Moreover we recall that since (ζt)t≥0 := (e−rtXt)t≥0 is a continuous super-martingale,
with last element ζ∞ := limt→∞ζt = 0, the optional sampling theorem guarantees (see
[22, Thm.1.3.22])
Ex
[
e−rρXρ|Fν
] ≤ e−rνXν , Px − a.s.(2.5)
for all stopping times ρ ≥ ν.
3. The game and its value
The payoffs Gi, i = 1, 2 in (1.2) are non-decreasing and 1-Lipschitz continuous on R+
with 0 ≤ G1 < G2. It is also clear that
limt→∞e−rtGi(X
x,y
t ) = 0, P− a.s.(3.1)
for any (x, y) ∈ R+ × (0, 1), due to the first formula in Remark 2.1. We now recall
the formulation of the game expected payoff (1.3) given in the Introduction and notice
that, thanks to the equivalence explained in the previous section, we can rewrite it as
(3.2) Mx,y(τ, γ) = E
[
e−rτG1(Xx,yτ )1{τ≤γ} + e
−rγG2(Xx,yγ )1{γ<τ}
]
.
The stopping times (τ, γ) are drawn from the set T of F-stopping times and the de-
pendence of Mx,y(τ, γ) on (x, y) is clearly expressed. Thanks to (3.1) on the event
{τ ∧ γ = +∞} we simply get a zero payoff for both players.
We recall here that player 1 (the buyer) picks τ in order to maximise (3.2), whereas
player 2 (the seller) chooses γ in order to minimise (3.2). The upper value V and the
lower value V of the game are expressed as in (1.4). We spend the rest of this section
proving that these functions indeed coincide so that the game has a value V .
We start by proving some regularity result of V and V .
Lemma 3.1. The functions V and V are:
(i) non-decreasing with respect to (w.r.t.) x and non-increasing w.r.t. y
(ii) 1-Lipschitz w.r.t. x, uniformly w.r.t. y ∈ [0, 1]
(iii) locally Lipschitz w. r. t. y, i.e. for f = V or f = V and a given constant C > 0
we have
|f(x, y)− f(x, y′)| ≤ C(1 + |x|)|y − y′|, ∀x > 0,∀y, y′ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Without loss of generality, we only provide full details for V .
[Proof of (i)] Let us first prove monotonicity with respect to x. Fix y ∈ (0, 1) and
x ≥ x′, then for any ε > 0, there exist a couple (τε, γε) such that
Mx,y(τε, γε) ≤ V (x, y) + ε
2
and Mx′,y(τε, γε) ≥ V (x′, y)− ε
2
.(3.3)
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Therefore we also have
V (x, y)− V (x′, y) ≥Mx,y(τε, γε)−Mx′,y(τε, γε)− ε
=E
[
e−r(τε∧γε)((Xx,yτε∧γε −K)+ − (Xx
′,y
τε∧γε −K)+)
]
− ε
≥− ε
where the last inequality follows by observing that Xx,yt ≥ Xx
′,y
t , P-a.s. for t ≥ 0 thanks
to (2.4). Since ε was arbitrary we have x 7→ V (x, y) non-decreasing.
To prove monotonicity with respect to y we argue in a similar way. We fix x ∈ R+
and y ≤ y′, and for any ε > 0 we can find a couple (τε, γε) such that
V (x, y)− V (x, y′) ≥Mx,y(τε, γε)−Mx,y′(τε, γε)− ε
=E
[
e−r(τε∧γε)((Xx,yτε∧γε −K)+ − (Xx,y
′
τε∧γε −K)+)
]
− ε
≥− ε.
For the last inequality this time we have used the comparison principle for SDEs, which
guarantees Y yt ≤ Y y
′
t , P-a.s. for t ≥ 0, and (2.4), which gives Xx,yt ≥ Xx,y
′
t , P-a.s. for
t ≥ 0. By arbitrariness of ε we obtain the claim.
[Proof of (ii)] As above we fix y ∈ (0, 1) and x ≥ x′ so that V (x, y) − V (x′, y) ≥ 0.
For any ε > 0 we can find a couple (τε, γε) such that
0 ≤ V (x, y)− V (x′, y) ≤Mx,y(τε, γε)−Mx′,y(τε, γε) + ε
≤E
[
e−r(τε∧γε)|Xx,yτε∧γε −Xx
′,y
τε∧γε |
]
+ ε(3.4)
where the second inequality uses the Lipschitz property of the call payoff. From (2.4)
we have
e−r(τε∧γε)|Xx,yτε∧γε −Xx
′,y
τε∧γε | ≤ |x− x′|eσWτε∧γε−
σ2
2
(τε∧γε).
Since exp(σWt − σ22 t), t ≥ 0 is a positive supermartingale, we deduce that
E[e−r(τε∧γε)|Xx,yτε∧γε −Xx
′,y
τε∧γε |] ≤ |x− x′|
and Lipschitz continuity in x follows from (3.4) since ε > 0 is arbitrary.
[Proof of (iii)] Now we use the equivalence between the couple (Xx,y, Y y) on the
space (Ω,F ,P) and the couple (Sx, Dy) on the space (Ω0,F0,P0y) (see explanation in
Sec. 2 and (1.3) and (3.2)) to write
Mx,y(γ, τ) =E0y
[
e−rτG1(Sxτ )1{τ≤γ} + e
−rγG2(Sxγ )1{γ<τ}
]
= y E0y
[
e−rτG1(Sxτ )1{τ≤γ} + e
−rγG2(Sxγ )1{γ<τ}
∣∣D = 1]
+ (1− y)E0y
[
e−rτG1(Sxτ )1{τ≤γ} + e
−rγG2(Sxγ )1{γ<τ}
∣∣D = 0]
for any couple (τ, γ) ∈ T S . Set
S1,xt = xe
σBt+(r−δ0−σ22 )t, S0,xt = xe
σBt+(r−σ22 )t
and notice that conditionally on D, the law of Sx is independent of y, so denoting EW
the expectation under the Wiener measure W we get
Mx,y(γ, τ) = y EW
[
e−rτG1(S1,xτ )1{τ≤γ} + e
−rγG2(S1,xγ )1{γ<τ}
]
+ (1− y)EW [e−rτG1(S0,xτ )1{τ≤γ} + e−rγG2(S0,xγ )1{γ<τ}](3.5)
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Now we use the above representation of the game payoff as follows. Fix x ∈ R+ and
y ≤ y′, then for any ε > 0 we find (τε, γε) ∈ T S such that
0 ≤V (x, y)− V (x, y′)
≤Mx,y(γε, τε)−Mx,y′(γε, τε) + ε
≤ |y − y′|
(
EW
[
e−rτεG1(S1,xτε )1{τε≤γε} + e
−rγεG2(S1,xγε )1{γε<τε}
]
+ EW
[
e−rτεG1(S0,xτε )1{τε≤γε} + e
−rγεG2(S0,xγε )1{γε<τε}
] )
+ ε.
For any stopping time ρ and for k = 0, 1 we have EW [e−rρSk,xρ ] ≤ x as in (2.5). Moreover
G1, G2 have linear growth so that the Lipschitz property of V (x, · ) follows. 
Now we can prove the existence of the value for the game. As explained in the
introduction, the main difficulty comes from the fact that we are working with a bi-
dimensional stopping game with a lack of uniform integrability on the stopping payoff.
Theorem 3.2. The game with payoff (3.2) has a value V (x, y) = V (x, y) = V (x, y) for
all (x, y) ∈ R+ × [0, 1]. Moreover player 2, i.e. the minimiser (seller), has an optimal
strategy
γ∗(x, y) = inf{t ≥ 0 |G2(Xx,yt ) ≤ V (Xx,yt , Y x,yt )}(3.6)
with the convention inf ∅ = +∞ and the process
e−r(t∧γ∗)V (Xx,yt∧γ∗ , Y
y
t∧γ∗), t ≥ 0
is a closed supermartingale.
Finally, if we define
τ∗(x, y) = inf{t ≥ 0 |V (Xx,yt , Y yt ) ≤ G1(Xx,yt )},(3.7)
with the convention inf ∅ = +∞ and the process
e−r(t∧τ∗)V (Xx,yt∧τ∗ , Y
y
t∧τ∗), t ≥ 0
is a (not necessarily closed) submartingale.
Proof: The proof of Theorem 3.2 is postponed to the Appendix.
Remarks 3.3. According to Lemma 3.1, the value function is non-increasing with re-
spect to y. Therefore for each y ∈ (0, 1), we have
V (x, y) ≥ limz→1V (x, z) def= V1(x),
where V1 is the game value when P(D = 1) = 1. According to [35], Theorem 2.1, the
value function V1 is strictly positive therefore V is also strictly positive.
4. Properties of the stopping regions
Having established that the game has a value V we can introduce the so-called con-
tinuation region
C := {(x, y) ∈ R+ × [0, 1] | G1(x) < V (x, y) < G2(x)}(4.1)
and the stopping regions for the two players, i.e.
(4.2) S1 = {(x, y) ∈ R+ × [0, 1] | V (x, y) = G1(x)} ,
for player 1, and
(4.3) S2 = {(x, y) ∈ R+ × [0, 1] | V (x, y) = G2(x)} ,
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for player 2. It is clear that C is open and S1, S2 are closed, because V is jointly
continuous (see Lemma 3.1), and obviously S1 ∩ S2 = ∅.
These sets are important because, according to theory on zero-sum Dynkin games,
the only candidate to be a Nash equilibrium is the pair (γ∗, τ∗) given by (3.6) and (3.7)
(see [32]). Under complete information the perpetual game call option has been studied
in [17] for y = 0 and in [35] for y = 1. Those papers analyse the geometry of the
continuation and stopping regions and for completeness we account for a summary of
their results in appendix. For future reference here we only note that [17, Sec. 5.1]
obtain
ε0 < K ⇔ S2 ∩ {y = 0} = [K,+∞).(4.4)
In the rest of this section we study the shape of the stopping regions. For that we
need to introduce the infinitesimal generator of the two-dimensional diffusion (X,Y ),
i.e. for any g ∈ C2(R+ × [0, 1])
(Lg)(x, y) :=
[
(r − δ0y)x∂g
∂x
+
1
2
σ2x2
∂2g
∂x2
(4.5)
+
δ20
2σ2
y2(1− y)2 ∂
2g
∂y2
− δ0xy(1− y) ∂
2g
∂x∂y
]
(x, y).
Let us also introduce the sets
A1 := {(x, y) ∈ (K,+∞)× [0, 1] | (LG1 − rG1)(x, y) > 0}(4.6)
A2 := {(x, y) ∈ (K,+∞)× [0, 1] | (LG2 − rG2)(x, y) < 0}(4.7)
and notice that indeed A1 = {(x, y) |xy < rK/δ0 and x > K} and A2 = {(x, y) |xy >
r(K − ε0)/δ0 and x > K}. We denote the complements of these sets by Aci , i = 1, 2 and
define {x > K} := (K,+∞)× [0, 1].
Proposition 4.1. We have,
S1 ⊆ Ac1 ∩ {x > K} and S2 ∩ {x > K} ⊆ Ac2.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove the first inclusion (i.e. for S1) because arguments for the
second one (i.e. for S2) are analogous.
Because V is strictly positive (Remark 3.3), it is clear that S1 ⊂ {x > K}. Fix
(x0, y0) ∈ {x > K}∩A1, then it is possible to find an open neighbourhood R of (x0, y0)
such that R ⊂ {x > K} ∩ A1, i.e. (L − r)G1 > 0 on R. Let τR be the exit time of
(Xx0,y0 , Y y0) from R and let ρ := τ∗ ∧ γ∗ ∧ τR, then Theorem 3.2 guarantees that
e−r(t∧ρ)V (Xt∧ρ, Yt∧ρ) is a Px0,y0-martingale for t ≥ 0.
Using this property and Itoˆ’s formula we obtain
V (x, y) = Ex0,y0
[
e−r(t∧ρ)V (Xt∧ρ, Yt∧ρ)
]
≥ Ex0,y0
[
e−r(t∧ρ)G1(Xt∧ρ)
]
= G1(x0) + Ex0,y0
[∫ t∧ρ
0
e−rs(LG1 − rG1)(Xs, Ys) ds
]
> G1(x0),
which implies (x0, y0) /∈ S1. 
Our next lemma shows that the stopping region S1 is up and right-connected while
the region S2 is down and left-connected on {x > K}.
Lemma 4.2. The following properties hold
(i) (x, y) ∈ S1 ⇒ (x, y′) ∈ S1 for y′ ≥ y.
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(ii) (x, y) ∈ S2 ⇒ (x, y′) ∈ S2 for y′ ≤ y.
(iii) (x, y) ∈ S1 ⇒ (x′, y) ∈ S1 for x′ ≥ x ≥ K.
(iv) (x, y) ∈ S2 ⇒ (x′, y) ∈ S2 for x ≥ x′ ≥ K.
Proof. The two first properties follow directly from the fact that y 7→ V (x, y) is non-
increasing. To prove (iii) let us fix (x, y) ∈ S1 (notice that in particular x ≥ K). Since
V (x, y) is 1-Lipschitz w.r.t. x and non-decreasing (see (i)-(ii) in Lemma 3.1) then for
all x′ ≥ x, we have
V (x′, y) ≤ V (x, y) + (x′ − x) = V (x, y) +G1(x′)−G1(x) = G1(x′),(4.8)
where we have used that G1(x
′) − G1(x) = x′ − x for x ≥ x′ ≥ K, and that G1(x) =
V (x, y) by assumption. Clearly (4.8) implies (x′, y) ∈ S1 as claimed. Similar arguments
give (iv). 
Lemma 4.3. For x < K, V (x, y) < G2(x). Hence S2 ∩ [(0,K)× (0, 1)] = ∅.
Proof. Notice that G2(x) = ε0 for (x, y) ∈ (0,K)× (0, 1) and therefore LG2 − rG2 < 0
on (0,K) × (0, 1) ⊂ A2. Let R ⊂ (0,K) × (0, 1) be an open set and fix (x, y) ∈ R.
Denote ρR := inf{t ≥ 0 | (Xt, Yt) /∈ R} and let τ∗ be defined by (3.7). Notice also that
τ∗ ≥ ρR, P-a.s. because player 1 does not stop in (0,K).
Then using Theorem 3.2 and Itoˆ formula we obtain
V (x, y) ≤E
(
e−r(t∧ρR)V (Xx,yt∧ρR , Y
y
t∧ρR)
)
≤ E
(
e−r(t∧ρR)G2(X
x,y
t∧ρR)
)
= G2(x)− rε0E
(∫ t∧ρR
0
e−rs ds
)
< G2(x).

The next Lemma shows that if the penalty for cancellation does not exceed the strike
price, i.e. ε0 < K, then the stopping region S2 is non-empty and unbounded.
Lemma 4.4. If ε0 < K then the set S2∩ [M,+∞)× (0, 1) is non-empty for all M ≥ K.
Proof. We argue by contradiction and assume that S2 ∩ [M,+∞) × (0, 1) is empty for
some M ≥ K. Fix (x, y) ∈ (M,+∞)× (0, 1) and denote
ρM (x, y) = inf{t ≥ 0 |Xx,yt ≤M},
then clearly γ∗ ≥ ρM almost surely. Theorem 3.2 therefore implies that
t 7→ e−r(t∧ρM )V (Xx,yt∧ρM , Y
x,y
t∧ρM ) is a supermartingale.
For any stopping time τ we have
V (x, y) ≥ E[e−rρMV (M,Y yρM )1{ρM<τ} + e−rτG1(Xx,yτ )1{τ≤ρM}].(4.9)
Using Lipschitz continuity (Lemma 3.1) and (4.4), we also have
V (M,y) ≥ V (M, 0)− C(1 +M)y = G2(M)− C(1 +M)y.
Plugging the latter into (4.9) to estimate V (M,Y yρM ), recalling x > M and using that
(e−rtY yt )t≥0 is a positive, bounded, supermartingale we obtain
V (x, y) ≥ E[e−rρMG2(M)1{ρM<τ} + e−rτG1(Xx,yτ )1{τ≤ρM}]− C(1 + x)y.
Since τ was arbitrary we then have V (x, y) ≥ fM (x, y)− C(1 + x)y where
fM (x, y) := sup
τ
E[e−rρMG2(M)1{ρM<τ} + e
−rτG1(Xx,yτ )1{τ≤ρM}].
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The same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 3.1 allow us to prove that
|fM (x, y)− fM (x, y′)| ≤ C(1 + x)|y − y′| for all y, y′ ∈ [0, 1] and x ∈ R+.
We can now use the above to obtain
V (x, y) ≥ fM (x, y)− C(1 + x)y ≥ fM (x, 0)− 2C(1 + x)y.(4.10)
Next we want to find a lower bound for fM (x, 0). Notice that for t ≥ 0
Y 0t = 0 and X
x,0
t = xe
σW+(r−σ2/2)t, P− a.s.
For n ≥ x, setting
ϕ(x) := x−
2r
σ2 , ψ(x) := x and τn := inf{t ≥ 0 |Xx,0 ≥ n}
we can rely on standard formulae for the Laplace transform of ρM and τn to obtain
fM (x, 0) ≥G2(M)E
[
e−rρM1{ρM<τn}
]
+G1(n)E
[
e−rτn1{ρM≥τn}
]
=G2(M)
ψ(x)ϕ(n)− ϕ(x)ψ(n)
ψ(M)ϕ(n)− ϕ(M)ψ(n) +G1(n)
ψ(M)ϕ(x)− ϕ(M)ψ(x)
ψ(M)ϕ(n)− ϕ(M)ψ(n) .
Letting n→∞ it is easy to check that
fM (x, 0) ≥ x− (K − ε0)
(
M
x
) 2r
σ2
> G2(x)
where the final inequality uses x > M . The latter and (4.10) imply that V (x, y) > G2(x)
for y sufficiently small, and thus a contradiction. 
Thanks to above lemmas we can define boundaries of the stopping regions as follows
b1(y) := inf{x ∈ [0,+∞) | V (x, y) = G1(x)},(4.11)
b2(y) := sup{x ∈ [0,+∞) | V (x, y) = G2(x)},(4.12)
with the usual convention that inf ∅ = +∞ and sup ∅ = 0. Notice that S2∩(R+×{y}) =
[K, b2(y)] if b2(y) ≥ K and it is empty otherwise. From Lemma 4.2 and because the
sets Si are closed, we deduce the next corollary
Corollary 4.5. The functions b1 and b2 are non-increasing on their respective domains
and determine the stopping sets as follows:
S1 = {(x, y) ∈ R+ × [0, 1] : x ≥ b1(y)}, S2 = {(x, y) ∈ R+ × [0, 1] : K ≤ x ≤ b2(y)}.
Moreover b1 is lower semi-continuous (hence right-continuous) whereas b2 is upper-
semi-continuous (hence left-continuous). Finally, thanks to Proposition 4.1 and the
definition of A1 and A2 we have b1 ≥ b2 on [0, 1].
Next we show b1 is a well-defined function on (0, 1).
Lemma 4.6. For all y ∈ (0, 1), b1(y) <∞.
Proof. Arguing by contradiction let us assume that there exists y0 ∈ (0, 1) such that
b1(y0) = +∞. Then by monotonicity of b1 ((i) and (iii) of Lemma 4.2) and lower semi
continuity, it holds b1(y) = +∞ on [0, y0].
Denote ρ0 := inf{t ≥ 0 | Yt ≥ y0}. We thus have ρ0 ≤ τ∗, Px,y-a.s. for any starting
point (x, y) with y ∈ (0, y0). From now on fix y ∈ (0, y0). Theorem 3.2 guarantees that
t 7→ e−r(t∧ρ0)V (Xx,yt∧ρ0 , Y yt∧ρ0) is a submartingale.
Therefore, using also that V ≤ G2, for any t > 0 we have
V (x, y) ≤E
[
e−r(ρ0∧t)V (Xx,yρ0∧t, Y
y
ρ0∧t)
]
≤ E
[
e−r(ρ0∧t)Xx,yρ0∧t
]
+ ε0 = α(t, y)x+ ε0
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with
α(t, y) := E
[
eσWρ0∧t−
σ2
2
(ρ0∧t)e−δ0
∫ ρ0∧t
0 Y
y
s ds
]
< E
[
eσWρ0∧t−
σ2
2
(ρ0∧t)
]
= 1.
According to the last two expressions above, for fixed y ∈ (0, y0), we get
limx→∞x−1V (x, y) = α(t, y) < 1 = limx→∞x−1G1(x)
which contradicts V ≥ G1. 
Lemma 4.7. If ε0 < K then
limy→0b2(y) = +∞, limy→0+ b1(y) = +∞.
Proof. From Corollary 4.5 we have b1(y) ≥ b2(y) for all y ∈ (0, 1) . Since Lemma 4.4
holds, then it must be limy→0b2(y) = +∞. The latter also gives limy→0b1(y) = +∞.

From now on, whenever we refer to properties of S2 and its boundary, we tacitly
assume that S2∩ (R+× (0, 1)) 6= ∅. We recall that indeed this is always true for ε0 < K,
thanks to Lemma 4.4. In this context we also denote
bK2 := sup{y > 0 | (K, y) ∈ S2},(4.13)
and notice that Lemma 4.4 (with M = K) implies that the set {y > 0 | (K, y) ∈ S2} is
non-empty.
5. A parabolic formulation of the problem
In order to study existence of Nash equilibria and regularity of the value function of
the game (beyond continuity) it is useful to introduce a deterministic transformation of
the process (X,Y ). Such transformation also unveils a parabolic nature of the problem.
Given (x, y) ∈ (0,∞)× (0, 1), let us define z = ln(x) + σ2δ0 ln(
y
1−y ) and the process Z
z
such that Zz0 = z and:
Zzt = ln(X
x,y
t ) +
σ2
δ0
ln
(
Y yt
1− Y yt
)
.(5.1)
Then setting
k := (r − σ22 − δ02 )(5.2)
it is not hard to check, by using Itoˆ’s formula, that Zz evolves according to
Zzt = z + kt, t ≥ 0.(5.3)
From (5.1) we observe that P-almost surely
Xx,yt = F (Z
z
t , Y
y
t ), t ≥ 0(5.4)
with F : R× (0, 1)→ R+ defined by
F (z, y) = exp
(
z − σ
2
δ0
ln
(
y
1− y
))
= ez
(
1− y
y
)σ2
δ0
.(5.5)
Notice that F is C2 on R×(0, 1). The process Z is indeed deterministic and of bounded
variation, hence it plays the role of a “time” process. Whether Z is increasing or
decreasing depends on the sign of k. In the rest of the paper we study the case k 6= 0
which is truly two-dimensional. We leave aside the case k = 0 that reduces to a one-
dimensional problem parametrised in the variable z.
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Remark 5.1. In the new coordinates it becomes clear that the law of (Xx,yt , Y
y
t ) is
supported on the curve {(F (z + kt, ζ), ζ), ζ ∈ (0, 1)}, which is a set of null Lebesgue
measure in R+ × [0, 1].
We can now look at our game in the new coordinates and consider the functions
H1, H2, v : R× (0, 1)→ R+ given by
v(z, y) := V (F (z, y), y), H1(z, y) := G1(F (z, y)), H2(z, y) := G2(F (z, y)).(5.6)
By construction, we have H1 ≤ v ≤ H2 and v is equal to the value of the stopping game
v(z, y) = sup
τ∈T
inf
γ∈T
E
[
e−rτH1(Zzτ , Y
y
τ )1{τ≤γ} + e
−rγH2(Zzγ , Y
y
γ )1{γ<τ}
]
For this new parametrization of the game we naturally introduce the continuation and
stopping regions
C′ :={(z, y) ∈ R× (0, 1) | H1(z, y) < v(z, y) < H2(z, y)}
S ′1 :={(z, y) ∈ R× (0, 1) | v(z, y) = H1(z, y)},
S ′2 :={(z, y) ∈ R× (0, 1) | v(z, y) = H2(z, y)}.
Using Lemma 3.1 it is immediate to verify that v is locally Lipschitz continuous in
R× (0, 1) so that C′ is open and S ′i, i = 1, 2 are closed. Moreover, it is clear that γ∗ and
τ∗ as in (3.6)-(3.7) are the entry times of (Z, Y ) into S ′2 and S ′1, respectively.
The infinitesimal generator associated with (Z, Y ) is defined by
(G f)(z, y) := k∂ f
∂ z
(z, y) +
1
2
(
δ0
σ
)2
y2(1− y)2 ∂
2f
∂ y2
(z, y),(5.7)
for f ∈ C1,2(R × [0, 1]). One advantage of this formulation is that G is a parabolic
operator and it is non-degenerate on R× (0, 1), so that the associated Cauchy-Dirichlet
problems admit classical solutions under standard assumptions on the boundary condi-
tions.
Since v is continuous then {e−rtv(Zt, Yt), t ≤ τ ′C} is a continuous martingale for τ ′C :=
inf{t ≥ 0 | (Zt, Yt) /∈ C′} (the latter follows from Theorem 3.2 and the fact that (X,Y )
is linked to (Z, Y ) by a deterministic map). We can use results of interior regularity for
solutions to parabolic PDEs (see, e.g., [25, Corollary 2.4.3]) and Itoˆ’s formula to deduce
that any solution f to (Gf − rf)(z, y) = 0 on Rη = (z0, z0 + η) × (y0 − η, y0 + η) ⊂ C′
with f = v on ∂Rη is C
∞(Rη) and coincides with v. Therefore, v ∈ C∞(C′) and thus it
satisfies
(Gv − rv)(z, y) = 0, for (z, y) ∈ C′,(5.8)
H1 ≤ v ≤ H2, on R× (0, 1),(5.9)
v|∂S′1 = H1|∂S′1 and v|∂S′2 = H2|∂S′2 .(5.10)
As a consequence, V ∈ C∞(C) as well.
We denote by RK the closure in R× (0, 1) of the set in which H1 > 0, i.e.
RK ={(z, y) ∈ R× (0, 1) | F (z, y) ≥ K} = {(z, y) ∈ R× (0, 1) | y ≤ yK(z)}(5.11)
where yK(z) := e
δ0/σ2 z/(Kδ0/σ
2
+ eδ0/σ
2 z). According to Proposition 4.1 and Lemma
4.3, the stopping regions S ′1 and S ′2 lie in RK . Notice that since yK is increasing, if
(z0, y0) ∈ RK then any pair (z, y0) belongs to RK for z ≥ z0. Somewhat in analogy
with (4.13) we also define
zK := sup{z ∈ R | (z, yK(z)) ∈ S ′2} and yK := yK(zK).(5.12)
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In the new coordinates the sets S ′1 and S ′2 are connected with respect to the z variable,
as illustrated in the next lemma.
Lemma 5.2. Let (z0, y0) ∈ RK .
(i) (z0, y0) ∈ S ′2 =⇒ (z, y0) ∈ S ′2 for all z ≤ z0, such that (z, y0) ∈ RK ,
(ii) (z0, y0) ∈ S ′1 =⇒ (z, y0) ∈ S ′1 for all z ≥ z0.
Proof. Using that z 7→ F (z, y) is increasing for each y ∈ (0, 1) it is not difficult to show
(by direct comparison) that z → v(z, y) is also non-decreasing. To prove (i) take z ≤ z0,
then (ii) of Lemma 3.1 implies
0 ≤ v(z0, y0)− v(z, y0) = V (F (z0, y0), y0)− V (F (z, y0), y0)(5.13)
≤ F (z0, y0)− F (z, y0) = H2(z0, y0)−H2(z, y0).
If (z0, y0) ∈ S ′2 then v(z0, y0) − H2(z0, y0) = 0 yielding v(z, y0) − H2(z, y0) ≥ 0. With
an analogous argument we can prove (ii). 
The stopping sets are not necessarily connected with respect to the y variable and
indeed we only have connected sets for some values of the rate δ0 and volatility σ of
X. In particular in the rest of the paper we make the following standing assumption
(unless otherwise specified).
Assumption 5.3. We assume σ
2
δ0
≥ 1.
For σ
2
δ0
≥ 1 the sets S ′1, S ′2 enjoy the next desired property.
Lemma 5.4. Let (z0, y0) ∈ RK , then
(i) (z0, y0) ∈ S ′2 =⇒ (z0, y) ∈ S ′2 for all y ≥ y0 such that (z0, y) ∈ RK ,
(ii) (z0, y0) ∈ S ′1 =⇒ (z0, y) ∈ S ′1 for all y ≤ y0.
Moreover it also holds
(iii) v(z, y′) ≤ v(z, y) for y′ ≥ y > yK(z), z ∈ R.
Proof. Take (x0, y0) ∈ RK , fix y ≥ y0 and let x0 = F (z0, y0). Let γ := γ∗(x0, y) be
optimal for player 2 in the game started at (x0, y) and τ an ε-optimal stopping time for
player 1 in the game started at (x0, y0). Recall also that on {τ ∧ γ = +∞} both players
have zero payoff due to (3.1). Then using that H2(z, y)−H2(z, y′) = H1(z, y)−H1(z, y′)
for all z ∈ R and y, y′ ∈ (0, 1) we obtain
v(z0, y0)− v(z0, y)(5.14)
≤E [e−rγH2(Zz0γ , Y y0γ )1{γ<τ} + e−rτH1(Zz0τ , Y y0τ )1{τ≤γ}]
− E [e−rγH2(Zz0γ , Y yγ )1{γ<τ} + e−rτH1(Zz0τ , Y yτ )1{τ≤γ}]+ ε
=E
[
e−r(γ∧τ)
(
H1(Z
z0
γ∧τ , Y
y0
γ∧τ )−H1(Zz0γ∧τ , Y yγ∧τ )
)]
+ ε.
Now we notice that, since Y yt ≥ Y y0t , P-a.s. for all t ≥ 0 and y 7→ F (z, y) is decreasing,
then
H1(Z
z0
γ∧τ , Y
y0
γ∧τ )−H1(Zz0γ∧τ , Y yγ∧τ ) ≤ F (Zz0γ∧τ , Y y0γ∧τ )− F (Zz0γ∧τ , Y yγ∧τ )(5.15)
and the right-hand side of the inequality is positive. Therefore we can use Fatou’s
lemma and (5.15) to obtain
v(z0, y0)− v(z0, y) ≤E
[
e−r(γ∧τ)
(
F (Zz0γ∧τ , Y
y0
γ∧τ )− F (Zz0γ∧τ , Y yγ∧τ )
)]
+ ε
≤ lim inf
t→+∞ E
[
e−r(γ∧τ∧t)
(
F (Zz0γ∧τ∧t, Y
y0
γ∧τ∧t)− F (Zz0γ∧τ∧t, Y yγ∧τ∧t)
)]
+ ε(5.16)
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Figure 1. An illustration of the sets S1, S2 (left) and of the sets S ′1, S ′2 (right).
Setting M ζs = e−rsF (Zz0s , Y
ζ
s ), for any ζ ∈ (0, 1) and s ∈ [0, t], Itoˆ formula gives
dM ζs = −δ0Y ζs M ζs dt+ σM ζs dWs.
Hence substituting the above into (5.16) and noticing that M ζ ∈ L2([0, t]×Ω), we can
use the optional sampling theorem to obtain
v(z0, y0)− v(z0, y) ≤F (z0, y0)− F (z0, y) + ε
+ δ0 lim inf
t→∞ E
[∫ γ∧τ∧t
0
(Y ys F (Z
z0
s , Y
y
s )− Y y0s F (Zz0s , Y y0s )) dt
]
.(5.17)
Using now that, for σ
2
δ0
≥ 1, the map y → yF (z, y) is non-increasing with
∂
∂y
(yF (z, y)) = ez
(
1− y
y
)σ2
δ0
(
1− σ
2/δ0
(1− y)
)
,(5.18)
and recalling once again that Y y· ≥ Y y0· , we see that (5.17) implies
v(z0, y0)− v(z0, y) ≤F (z0, y0)− F (z0, y) + ε.(5.19)
Since ε is arbitrary then y 7→ (v(z, y)−F (z, y)) is non-decreasing and therefore (i) and
(ii) easily follow.
The proof of (iii) follows from the fact that y 7→ Hi(z, y) is decreasing for i = 1, 2. 
The next corollary is a simple consequence of Lemma 5.2 and 5.4. We recall that
Si ∩RcK = ∅ as no player stops for Xt < K (see Remark 3.3 and Lemma 4.3).
Corollary 5.5. There exists non-decreasing functions c1 : R→ [0, 1], c2 : (−∞, zK ]→
[0, 1], with c1(·) ≤ c2(·) ≤ yK(·) on (−∞, zK ] and c1(·) ≤ yK(·) on (zK ,+∞), such that
S ′1 = {(z, y) ∈ R× [0, 1] | y ≤ c1(z)},(5.20)
S ′2 = {(z, y) ∈ (−∞, zK ]× [0, 1] | y ∈ [c2(z), yK(z)]}.(5.21)
Next we provide continuity of the boundaries bi and ci, i = 1, 2.
Proposition 5.6. The stopping boundaries b1, b2 and c1, c2 are continuous.
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Proof. Step 1. First we prove the claim for b1, b2. Since the proofs are similar for the two
boundaries, we only provide details for b2. According to Corollary 4.5, the boundary b2
is left-continuous. To show the right-continuity, we will argue by contradiction.
Assume that there exists y0 ∈ (0, 1) such that b2(y0+) < b2(y0) and fix x0 ∈
(b2(y0+), b2(y0)). Next define z0 by F (z0, y0) = x0 and notice that since x0 < b2(y0),
then (F (z0, y0), y0) ∈ S2 and therefore (z0, y0) ∈ S ′2. We take a decreasing sequence
(yn)n with yn ↓ y0 as n → ∞ so that Lemma 5.4 implies that (z0, yn) ∈ S ′2 for all
n. Equivalently xn = F (z0, yn) ≤ b2(yn) so that taking limits and using that F is
continuous, we obtain x0 = F (z0, y0) ≤ b(y0+). The latter is a contradiction.
Step 2. Now we show continuity of c1, c2. Let us start from c2 and fix z0. Take a
sequence zn ↑ z0 as n→∞ so that (zn, c2(zn))→ (z0, c2(z0−)), where c2(z0−) ≤ c2(z0)
and the limit exists by monotonicity. Since S ′2 is closed we have (z0, c2(z0−)) ∈ S ′2 and
therefore c2(z0−) ≥ c2(z0), hence implying left-continuity.
To prove that c2 is also right-continuous we use Theorem 3.3 in [8]. Since the latter
theorem is not given in our game context we repeat here some arguments for com-
pleteness. Let us assume c2(z0) < c2(z0+) and denote y0 := c2(z0), y1 := c2(z0+) for
simplicity. Fix z1 > z0 such that the open rectangle R with vertices (z0, y0), (z0, y1),
(z1, y1) and (z1, y0) is contained in C′. Let w := v −H2 and w := ∂w/∂y, then results
of interior regularity for solutions to PDEs (see e.g. [25, Corollary 2.4.3]) imply that
w ∈ C1,2(R) and, by deriving (5.8) with respect to y, it turns out that(
k
∂w
∂z
+Aw − rw
)
(z, y) = δ0h(z, y), for (z, y) ∈ R,(5.22)
where h(z, y) := ∂∂y (yF (z, y)) and
A := 12
(
δ0
σ
)2
y2(1− y)2 ∂
2
∂y2
+
(
δ0
σ
)2
y(1− y)(1− 2y) ∂
∂y
.
Let ψ ∈ C∞c (y0, y1) be positive and such that
∫ y1
y0
ψ(y)dy = 1. Multiply (5.22) by ψ
and integrate by parts over (y0, y1) to obtain
Lψ(z) :=k
∫ y1
y0
∂w
∂z
(z, y)ψ(y)dy(5.23)
=
∫ y1
y0
w(z, y)
∂
∂y
[(r −A∗)]ψ(y)dy + δ0
∫ y1
y0
h(z, y)ψ(y)dy,
where A∗ is the adjoint operator of A. Now, taking limits as z ↓ z0, we can use
dominated convergence in the right hand side of the above equation and the fact that
w(z0, ·) = 0 on (y0, y1), to find
Lψ(z0+) = limz↓z0Lψ(z) = δ0
∫ y1
y0
h(z0, y)ψ(y)dy ≤ −δ0`.(5.24)
In the final inequality we set −` := sup(y0,y1) h(z0, y) and notice that ` > 0 due to
σ2/δ0 ≥ 1 (see (5.18)).
By its definition Lψ ∈ C(z0, z1) and (5.24) implies that its right limit at z0 exists
and it is strictly negative. Then for some δ > 0, using integration by parts and Fubini’s
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theorem, we have
0 >
∫ z0+δ
z0
Lψ(z)dz = −k
∫ y1
y0
(∫ z0+δ
z0
∂w
∂z
(z, y)dz
)
ψ′(y)dy
=− k
∫ y1
y0
w(z0 + δ, y)ψ
′(y)dy = k
∫ y1
y0
∂w
∂y
(z0 + δ, y)ψ(y)dy ≥ 0,(5.25)
where the last inequality follows because w(z0 + δ, ·) is non-decreasing as shown in the
proof of Lemma 5.4. Therefore we reach a contradiction and c2 must be continuous at
z0. By arbitrariness of z0 we conclude that c2 is continuous.
To prove continuity of c1 we simply refer to [8, Thm. 3.1]. The latter is not obtained in
a game context but arguments as above allow a straightforward extension to it. We also
notice that in applying that theorem we use that v is locally Lipschitz on R× (0, 1). 
6. Regularity across the boundaries
In this section we show that the value function V is indeed C1 in R∗+×(0, 1). The key
to this result is the so-called regularity of the optimal boundaries. Roughly speaking
this means that the process (X,Y ) immediately enters the interior of the sets S1 and
S2 upon hitting their boundaries ∂S1 and ∂S2. Analogous considerations apply to the
process (Z, Y ) and the sets S ′1, S ′2.
We recall that we work under Assumption 5.3. Let us introduce the hitting times
τˆ∗ := inf{t > 0 | (Xt, Yt) ∈ S1} = inf{t > 0 | (Zt, Yt) ∈ S ′1}(6.1)
γˆ∗ := inf{t > 0 | (Xt, Yt) ∈ S2} = inf{t > 0 | (Zt, Yt) ∈ S ′2}.(6.2)
The next lemma provides a clear statement of the regularity of the optimal boundaries
for the diffusions (X,Y ) and (Z, Y ). Its proof is postponed to the end of the section so
that we can move quickly towards the main result, i.e. Proposition 6.4.
Lemma 6.1. If (x0, y0) ∈ ∂S1 (resp. (z0, y0) ∈ ∂S ′1) then
Px0,y0(τˆ∗ > 0) = 0 (resp. Pz0,y0(τˆ∗ > 0) = 0).(6.3)
Similarly, if (x0, y0) ∈ ∂S2 (resp. (z0, y0) ∈ ∂S ′2) then
Px0,y0(γˆ∗ > 0) = 0 (resp. Pz0,y0(γˆ∗ > 0) = 0).(6.4)
Notice that if k > 0 (6.4) holds with (x0, y0) 6= (K, bK2 ) (resp. (z0, y0) 6= (zK , yK)).
Adopting the convention that [K, b2(y)] = ∅ for y > yK and [c2(z), yK(z)] = ∅ for
z > zK , we can use Corollary 5.5 and write P-a.s.
τˆ∗ = inf{t > 0 |Xt ≥ b1(Yt)} = inf{t > 0 |Yt ≤ c1(Zt)}(6.5)
γˆ∗ = inf{t > 0 |Xt ∈ [K, b2(Yt)]} = inf{t > 0 |Yt ∈ [c2(Zt), yK(Zt)]}.(6.6)
To avoid further technicalities we assume that
c2(z) 6= yK(z) for z < zK (resp. b2(y) 6= K for y < bK2 ),
however all the results of this section can be easily adapted to the case in which c2 = yK
for some z (i.e. b2 = K for some y).
We consider hitting times to the interior of the stopping sets, i.e. we define P-a.s.
τˇ := inf{t > 0 |Xt > b1(Yt)} = inf{t > 0 |Yt < c1(Zt)}(6.7)
γˇ := inf{t > 0 |Xt ∈ (K, b2(Yt))} = inf{t > 0 |Yt ∈ (c2(Zt), yK(Zt))}.(6.8)
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Notice that for each line, the second equality follows from the continuity of the optimal
boundaries. Precisely, for all (z, y) ∈ RK , we have the equivalences
F (z, y) < b2(y)⇔ y > c2(z), and F (z, y) > b1(y)⇔ y < c1(z).
We remark that if c2 = yK on an interval I then γˇ should account also for the first
crossing time of c2 |I .
An argument used in [5], Corollary 8 (see eq. (2.39) therein) allows us to obtain the
next useful lemma. The proof, originally developed in [5] is given in Appendix B for
the reader’s convenience.
Lemma 6.2. For any (x, y) ∈ R× [0, 1] we have
Px,y(τˆ∗ = τˇ) = Px,y(γˆ∗ = γˇ) = 1.(6.9)
Equivalently for any (z, y) ∈ R× (0, 1] we have
Pz,y(τˆ∗ = τˇ) = Pz,y(γˆ∗ = γˇ) = 1.(6.10)
The above lemma says that the process (X,Y ) (or equivalently (Z, Y )), upon hitting
the optimal boundaries, will immediately enter the interior of the stopping set. This
has the following important consequence
Proposition 6.3. Let (xn, yn)n be a sequence in C and let τˆn∗ := τˆ∗(xn, yn) and γˆn∗ :=
γˆ∗(xn, yn) denote the corresponding hitting times for the process (Xxn,yn , Y yn). It follows
that
(i) If (xn, yn)→ (x0, y0) ∈ S1 as n→ +∞, then τˆ∗(xn, yn)→ 0, P-a.s.
(ii) If (xn, yn)→ (x0, y0) ∈ S2 as n→ +∞, then γˆ∗(xn, yn)→ 0, P-a.s.
Notice that if k > 0 the above holds with (x0, y0) 6= (K, bK2 ).
Proof. Let us consider (ii) and with no loss of generality let x0 = b2(y0) (arguments as
below apply also to x0 = K). Denote γˇ
n := γˇ(xn, yn). Since γˆ
n∗ = γˇn by Lemma 6.2,
it is sufficient to prove that γˇn → 0. In particular γˇ(x0, y0) = 0, P-a.s. by Lemma 6.2
and Lemma 6.1. Hence there exists a set of null measure N such that γˇ(x0, y0) = 0
and (x, y) → (Xx,y, Y y) is continuous, for all ω ∈ Ω \ N . Fix ω ∈ Ω \ N and an
arbitrary α > 0. We can find t < α such that Xx0,y0t (ω) < b2(Y
y0
t (ω)). It follows
that for all n sufficiently large Xxn,ynt (ω) < b2(Y
yn
t (ω)) because (X
xn,yn
t (ω), Y
yn
t (ω))→
(Xx0,y0t (ω), Y
y0
t (ω)) and b2 is continuous. Therefore lim supn γˇ
n(ω) < α. Since α is
arbitrary and the argument holds for a.e. ω we obtain (ii).
The proof of (i) follows from an analogous argument. 
Now we can use the result above to obtain continuous differentiability of the value
function. In preparation for that we need to recall some results concerning differentia-
bility of the stochastic flow. In particular by [33], Theorem 39, Chapter V.7 we can
define the process
for all t ≥ 0, Uyt :=
∂Y yt
∂y
P− a.s.(6.11)
which is continuous in both t and y and solves the SDE
dUyt = −
δ0
σ
(1− 2Y yt )Uyt dWt, Uy0 = 1 P− a.s.(6.12)
Notice that the couple (Y,U) forms a Markov process and that Uyt is an exponential
local martingale. Moreover, since the process Y is bounded, it is not difficult to see
that Novikov condition holds and Uyt is indeed an exponential martingale. Finally we
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also remark here that (Y, U) is a strong solution of a SDE and notice that, using the
explicit representation (2.4), we also have
∂
∂x
Xx,yt = X
1,y
t P− a.s..
For all (x, y) ∈ R× [0, 1] we set
u(x, y) := V (x, y)− (x−K),(6.13)
(6.14)
and define the process (Pt)t≥0 as
Pt = e
rtu(Xt, Yt) +
∫ t
0
e−rs(rK − δ0XsYs)ds Px,y − a.s.(6.15)
Then from the semi-harmonic characterisation of the value function provided in Theo-
rem 3.2, we obtain for any T > 0
(Pt∧γ∗∧τ∗)t≤T is a Px,y martingale(6.16)
(Pt∧τ∗)t≤T is a Px,y sub-martingale(6.17)
(Pt∧γ∗)t≤T is a Px,y super-martingale.(6.18)
For future reference we also introduce
τK(x, y) := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xx,yt ≤ K}(6.19)
and denote by C′ the closure of C′.
Proposition 6.4. The value function V is C1 in R+×(0, 1) (possibly with the exception
of the point (K, bK2 ) if k > 0). Moreover vyy (see (5.6)) is continuous on C′ (possibly on
C′ \ (zK , yK) if k > 0).
Proof. The value function is C1 inside the continuation set C by simply recalling that
v ∈ C1 in C′ (see the free boundary problem (5.8)–(5.10)). Therefore we only need to
prove the C1 property across the optimal boundaries. We provide full details for the
continuity of uy := ∂u/∂y as the continuity of ux := ∂u/∂x follows analogous arguments
up to trivial modifications.
Let us start by looking at points of ∂S1, i.e. the boundary of the stopping region for
the buyer. Let us fix (x0, y0) ∈ ∂S1 and let us pick (x, y) inside the continuation set
C ∩ {x > K}. Later we will take limits (x, y)→ (x0, y0) and use Proposition 6.3.
Denote by τ∗ = τ∗(x, y) the first entry time of (Xx,y, Y y) into S1 and by γε =
γ∗(x, y + ε) the first entry time of (Xx,y+ε, Y y+ε) into S2 for some ε > 0. From (i) of
Lemma 3.1 and (6.13) we know that u(x, y+ε)−u(x, y) ≤ 0 since V is non-increasing in
y. In order to find a lower bound for u(x, y+ε)−u(x, y) we want to use the semi-harmonic
property of (Pt)t≥0. For that we introduce the stopping time λε := τ∗ ∧ γε ∧ τ εK ∧ T
where T > 0 is fixed and τ εK = τK(x, y+ ε). Notice that since X
x,y+ε ≤ Xx,y (see (2.4))
then τK(x, y + ε) ≤ τK(x, y). Now, using (6.17) and (6.18) we obtain
u(x, y + ε)− u(x, y)(6.20)
≥E
[
e−rλεu(Xx,y+ελε , Y
y+ε
λε
) +
∫ λε
0
e−rt(rK − δ0Xx,y+εt Y y+εt )dt
]
− E
[
e−rλεu(Xx,yλε , Y
y
λε
) +
∫ λε
0
e−rt(rK − δ0Xx,yt Y yt )dt
]
.
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Notice that 0 ≤ u ≤ ε on [K,+∞)× [0, 1] and
τ∗ ≤ γε ∧ τ εK ∧ T =⇒ u(Xx,yλε , Y
y
λε
) = 0 ≤ u(Xx,y+ελε , Y
y+ε
λε
)
γε ≤ τ∗ ∧ τ εK ∧ T =⇒ u(Xx,y+ελε , Y
y+ε
λε
) = ε ≥ u(Xx,yλε , Y
y
λε
)
so that
on {τ∗ ∧ γε ≤ τ εK ∧ T} we have u(Xx,y+ελε , Y
y+ε
λε
) ≥ u(Xx,yλε , Y
y
λε
).(6.21)
Using this fact in (6.20) we get
u(x, y + ε)− u(x, y)
≥E
[
1{τεK∧T<τ∗∧γε}e
−r(τεK∧T )
(
u(Xx,y+ετεK∧T , Y
y+ε
τεK∧T )− u(X
x,y
τεK∧T , Y
y
τεK∧T )
)]
+ δ0E
[ ∫ λε
0
e−rt(Xx,yt Y
y
t −Xx,y+εt Y y+εt )dt
]
.
Now we use that Xx,y+ε ≤ Xx,y (see (2.4)) and that x 7→ u(x, y) is non-increasing (as
shown in the proof of (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 4.2). Therefore from the right-hand side
of the above inequality we easily get
u(x, y + ε)− u(x, y)(6.22)
≥E
[
1{τεK∧T<τ∗∧γε}e
−r(τεK∧T )
(
u(Xx,yτεK∧T , Y
y+ε
τεK∧T )− u(X
x,y
τεK∧T , Y
y
τεK∧T )
)]
+ δ0E
[ ∫ λε
0
e−rtXx,yt (Y
y
t − Y y+εt )dt
]
.
Lower bounds can be provided for both terms on the right-hand side of the above
expression. For the first term we recall (iii) of Lemma 3.1 and get
E
[
1{τεK∧T<τ∗∧γε}e
−r(τεK∧T )
(
u(Xx,yτεK∧T , Y
y+ε
τεK∧T )− u(X
x,y
τεK∧T , Y
y
τεK∧T )
)]
≥− C E
[
1{τεK∧T<τ∗∧γε}e
−r(τεK∧T )(1 +Xx,yτεK∧T )
(
Y y+ετεK∧T − Y
y
τεK∧T
) ]
=− εC E
[
1{τεK∧T<τ∗∧γε}e
−r(τεK∧T )(1 +Xx,yτεK∧T )∆Y
ε
τεK∧T
]
≥− εC E
[
1{τεK∧T<τ∗}e
−r(τεK∧T )(1 +Xx,yτεK∧T )∆Y
ε
τεK∧T
]
(6.23)
where ∆Y εt :=
1
ε (Y
y+ε
t −Y yt ), and the final inequality follows by observing that {τ∗∧γε >
τ εK ∧ T} ⊆ {τ∗ > τ εK ∧ T} and that the quantity under expectation is positive. For the
integral term in (6.22) we argue in a similar way and obtain
E
[ ∫ λε
0
e−rtXx,yt (Y
y
t − Y y+εt )dt
]
=− εE
[ ∫ λε
0
e−rtXx,yt ∆Y
ε
t dt
]
≥− εE
[ ∫ τ∗∧τεK∧T
0
e−rtXx,yt ∆Y
ε
t dt
]
(6.24)
Collecting (6.22), (6.23) and (6.24) we find
u(x, y + ε)− u(x, y)
ε
≥ −C E
[
1{τεK∧T<τ∗}e
−r(τεK∧T )(1 +Xx,yτεK∧T )∆Y
ε
τεK∧T
]
− E
[ ∫ τ∗∧τεK∧T
0
e−rtXx,yt ∆Y
ε
t dt
]
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and we now aim at taking limits as ε → 0. In order to apply dominated convergence,
it is sufficient to prove that the family of random variables (Xx,yτ ,∆Y ετ ) is uniformly
bounded in L4 when τ ranges through all [0, T ] valued stopping times and ε ∈ (0, 1−y).
Indeed, by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, this will imply that Xx,yτ ·∆Y ετ is bounded in L2
uniformly with respect to ε and τ .
The bound for X follows directly from the explicit expression (2.4). Note then that
∆Y ε is an exponential martingale. Indeed, denoting Hεt = − δ0σ (1−Y yt −Y y+εt ), we have
∆Y εt = exp
[∫ t
0
HεsdWs −
1
2
∫ t
0
(Hεs )
2ds
]
.
It follows that
(∆Y εt )
4 = exp
[
4
∫ t
0
HεsdWs − 4
1
2
∫ t
0
(Hεs )
2ds
]
= exp
[
6
∫ t
0
(Hεs )
2ds
]
exp
[∫ t
0
4HεsdWs −
1
2
∫ t
0
(4Hεs )
2ds
]
Since Hε is uniformly bounded by δ0σ , the second term in the above expression is a
martingale, and we deduce that for any stopping time τ taking values in [0, T ]
E[(∆Y ε)4τ ] ≤ exp(6T
δ20
σ2
).
Using that ∆Y εt → Uyt almost surely for all t ≥ 0, as ε→ 0, we conclude
0 ≥ uy(x, y) ≥− C E
[
1{τK∧T<τ∗}e
−r(τK∧T )(1 +Xx,yτK∧T )U
y
τK∧T
]
(6.25)
− E
[ ∫ τ∗∧τK∧T
0
e−rtXx,yt U
y
t dt
]
.
In the above estimate we have used that
τ εK ↑ τK and 1{τεK∧T<τ∗} → 1{τK∧T<τ∗} as ε→ 0,(6.26)
which follows from the continuity of (x, y) → Xx,y and the fact that P(τ∗ = τK) = 0
(see Proposition 4.1).
Notice that the above estimates also imply that Uyτ is bounded in L4 and X
x,y
τ · Uyτ
is bounded in L2, uniformly with respect to stopping times τ ∈ [0, T ] and (x, y) ∈
[K,x0 + 1]× (0, 1).
It remains to take limits as (x, y) → (x0, y0) with (x, y) ∈ C. By continuity of the
sample paths τ∗(x, y) = τˆ∗(x, y) for (x, y) ∈ C. We use (i) of Proposition 6.3, dominated
convergence and (6.25) (along with the fact that Px0,y0(τK > 0) = 1) to obtain
lim(x,y)→(x0,y0)uy(x, y) = 0.(6.27)
The latter implies continuity of uy at ∂S1.
To prove that uy is also continuous across ∂S2 we need to argue in a slightly different
way. Fix (x0, y0) ∈ ∂S2 with y0 < bK2 and pick (x, y) ∈ C. With no loss of generality
we consider x0 = b2(y0) as the proof requires minor changes for x0 = K. We set γ∗ =
γ∗(x, y) the first entry time of (Xx,y, Y y) into S2 and denote by τε = τ∗(x, y−ε) the first
entry time of (Xx,y−ε, Y y−ε) into S1 for some ε > 0. Then we define ηε := τε∧γ∗∧τK∧T
for some T > 0. Again we recall that τK = τK(x, y) ≤ τK(x, y − ε).
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We know that u(x, y) − u(x, y − ε) ≤ 0 from (i) of Lemma 3.1 and (6.13). In order
to find a lower bound we use (6.17) and (6.18) and get
u(x, y)− u(x, y − ε)
≥E
[
e−rηεu(Xx,yηε , Y
y
ηε) +
∫ ηε
0
e−rt(rK − δ0Xx,yt Y yt )dt
]
− E
[
e−rηεu(Xx,y−εηε , Y
y−ε
ηε ) +
∫ ηε
0
e−rt(rK − δ0Xx,y−εt Y y−εt )dt
]
.
From this point onwards we can repeat the arguments used above up to trivial modifi-
cations. These allow us to conclude that uy is continuous across ∂S2 with the possible
exception of (K, bK2 ), because Proposition 6.3 does not hold at that point if k > 0.
As already mentioned, analogous arguments allow to prove that ux is also continuous
everywhere with the possible exception of (K, bK2 ). It follows that V ∈ C1 on (R+ ×
(0, 1)) \ (K, bK2 ) and v ∈ C1 on (R× (0, 1)) \ (zK , yK) (see (5.6)). The latter and (5.8)
imply that vyy is continuous on C′ \ (zK , yK) as claimed. 
It remains to prove Lemma 6.1 and for that it is convenient to change variables to
the coordinate system (z, y). We set
w(z, y) = u(F (z, y), y)(6.28)
with the notation wz := ∂w/∂z, wy := ∂w/∂y and wyy := ∂
2w/∂y2. In these variables
τK from (6.19) reads
τK(z, y) = inf{t ≥ 0 : F (Zzt , Y yt ) ≤ K}.
Notice that for k > 0 the boundary c1 is non-decreasing and the stopping set S ′1 lies
below it. Hence (6.3) is a consequence of standard arguments involving the law of
iterated logarithm. Showing (6.4) for k > 0 is instead more difficult because c2 is also
non-decreasing but S ′2 lies above the boundary. A symmetric situation occurs for k < 0.
In what follows we first show that the classical smooth-fit condition holds and then
prove that under our assumptions this implies Lemma 6.1. In the next lemma we only
consider smooth-fit in those cases when the monotonicity of the boundary does not
allow a direct proof of (6.3) or (6.4) based on the law of iterated logarithm.
Lemma 6.5. If (z0, y0) ∈ ∂S ′1 and k < 0, then wy(z0, y0+) = 0. Analogously if
(z0, y0) ∈ ∂S ′2, with z0 < zK and y0 = c2(z0), and k > 0 then wy(z0, y0−) = 0. Finally,
if (z0, y0) ∈ ∂S ′2, with y0 = yK(z0) and k < 0 then vy(z0, y0+) = 0.
Proof. We carry out the proof under the assumption of k > 0 (see (5.2)). This induces
no loss in generality as symmetric arguments hold for k < 0.
Let (z0, y0) ∈ ∂S ′2 with y0 = c2(z0). Notice that for y ∈ (y0, yK(z0)) we have
wy(z0, y) = 0. Also we know from the proof of (i) in Lemma 5.4 that wy ≥ 0 lo-
cally at (z0, y0). We argue by contradiction and assume wy(z0, y0−) ≥ λ0 > 0. The
latter limit exists because wz is locally bounded (see (5.13)) and |wyy| ≤ c|wz| in C′ due
to (5.8), for a suitable c > 0.
Fix ε > 0, consider the open rectangle Rε := (z0, z0 + ε) × (y0 − ε, y0 + ε) and let
ρε = inf{t ≥ 0 : (Zz0t , Y y0t ) /∈ Rε}. With no loss of generality we assume ρε ≤ τK ∧ τ∗
and from (6.17) we obtain
w(z0, y0) ≤ E
[
e−r(t∧ρε)w(Zz0t∧ρε , Y
y0
t∧ρε) +
∫ t∧ρε
0
e−rs(rK − δ0Y y0s F (Zz0s , Y y0s ))ds
]
.
(6.29)
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Since w( · , y) is non-increasing (see (5.13)) and Rε is bounded we can find a constant
Cε > 0 depending on Rε and such that
w(z0, y0) ≤ E
[
e−r(t∧ρε)w(z0, Y
y0
t∧ρε) + Cε(t ∧ ρε)
]
.(6.30)
Recalling that wyy(z0, ·) is bounded on [y0 − ε, y0 + ε] \ {y0}, we can apply Itoˆ-Tanaka
formula to get
w(z0, y0) ≤w(z0, y0) + E
[∫ t∧ρε
0
e−rs
δ20
2σ2
[Y y0s (1− Y y0s )]2wyy(z0, Y y0s )1{Y y0s 6=y0}ds
]
+ E
[
1
2
∫ t∧ρε
0
e−rs(wy(z0, y0+)− wy(z0, y0−))dLy0s (Y y0) + Cε(t ∧ ρε)
]
.(6.31)
Boundedness of wyy(z0, · ) and the assumption wy(z0, y0−) ≥ λ0 give
0 ≤− 1
2
λ0E
[∫ t∧ρε
0
e−rsdLy0s (Y
y0)
]
+ C ′εE [(t ∧ ρε)](6.32)
for some positive C ′ε > 0. For 0 < p < 1, Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality and some
algebra give
E
[∫ t∧ρε
0
e−rsdLy0s (Y
y0)
]
≥E [e−rtLy0t∧ρε(Y y0)]
=e−rtE
[|Y y0t∧ρε − y0|] ≥ e−rt(2ε)pE [|Y y0t∧ρε − y0|1+p]
≥ e
−rt
(2ε)p
cpE
[
〈Y y0〉
1+p
2
t∧ρε
]
≥ e
−rt
(2ε)p
cp,εE
[
(t ∧ ρε)
1+p
2
]
,(6.33)
with cp,ε > 0 depending on p and ε. Plugging the latter inside (6.32) and letting t→ 0
we reach a contradiction. Therefore it must be wy(z0, y0−) = 0.
The proof is entirely analogous for (z0, y0) ∈ ∂S ′1 and k < 0. It is also worth notic-
ing that for (z0, y0) ∈ ∂S ′2 with y0 = yK(z0), the smooth-fit condition amounts to
vy(z0, y0+) = 0 because the stopping payoff is ε0. Using (iii) in Lemma 5.4 and argu-
ments similar to those above we can prove that vy(z0, y0+) = 0 holds. 
Proof of Lemma 6.1. Here we only consider the case k > 0 but the same results hold
for k < 0 and these can be proven by symmetric arguments. It is convenient to recall
the function w from (6.28).
The proof of (6.3), which we omit for brevity, is a straightforward consequence of the
fact that c1 is non-decreasing and Yt is non-degenerate away from 0 and 1, so that the
law of iterated logarithm can be applied. The same rationale allows to prove that (6.4)
holds for y0 = yK(z0) for z0 < zK .
To prove (6.4) with y0 = c2(z0) and z0 < zK let us argue by contradiction and assume
that (x0, y0) ∈ ∂S2 ∩ {x > K} is not regular or equivalently (z0, y0) ∈ ∂S ′2 ∩ RK is not
regular (with F (z0, y0) = x0), i.e. (6.4) does not hold. Pick y < y0 and ε > 0 such that
y + ε < y0. Denote γˆε = γˆ∗(z0, y + ε), τˆ = τˆ∗(z0, y), γˆ = γˆ∗(z0, y), τ εK = τK(z0, y + ε).
Notice that τK(z0, y) ≥ τK(z0, y + ε), then from (6.17) and (6.18) and setting λε :=
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τˆ ∧ γˆε ∧ τ εK ∧ T we obtain
w(z0, y + ε)− w(z0, y) ≥E
[∫ λε
0
e−rtδ0
(
Y yt F (Z
z0
t , Y
y
t )− Y y+εt F (Zz0t , Y y+εt )
)
dt
]
+ E
[
e−rλε
(
w(Zz0λε , Y
y+ε
λε
)− w(Zz0λε , Y
y
λε
)
)]
≥E
[∫ λε
0
e−rtδ0
(
Y yt F (Z
z0
t , Y
y
t )− Y y+εt F (Zz0t , Y y+εt )
)
dt
]
(6.34)
where in the last inequality we have used that y 7→ w(z, y) is non-decreasing as shown
in the proof of Lemma 5.4. Recall that ∂∂y (yF (z, y)) is strictly negative (see (5.18)) so
that almost surely and for all ε > 0 we have∫ λε
0
e−rtδ0
(
Y yt F (Z
z0
t , Y
y
t )− Y y+εt F (Zz0t , Y y+εt )
)
dt ≥ 0.
As in the proof of Proposition 6.4 we have τ εK ↑ τK as ε→ 0. Moreover γˆε increases1
as ε→ 0, hence γˆ− := limε→0γˆε ≤ γˆ, P-a.s. To prove the reverse inequality we fix ω ∈ Ω
and pick δ > 0 such that γˆ(ω) > δ. Then in particular we have
inf
0≤t≤δ
(c2(Z
z0
t )− Y yt )(ω) ≥ cδ(ω) > 0(6.35)
for some cδ. Recall that (t, y) 7→ Uyt (ω) is continuous, hence bounded on [0, δ] × [0, 1]
by a constant c′δ(ω) > 0. Using that |Y y+εt − Y yt |(ω) ≤ c′δ(ω) · ε we find
inf
0≤t≤δ
(c2(Z
z0
t )− Y y+εt )(ω) ≥ cδ(ω)− c′δ(ω) · ε
from (6.35). This implies that for all ε sufficiently small γˆε(ω) > δ. Since δ was arbitrary
we conclude limε→0γˆε(ω) = γˆ(ω). The argument holds for a.e. ω ∈ Ω hence we obtain
limε→0γˆε = γˆ, P− a.s.
Convergence of γˆε and τ
ε
K imply
limε→0λε = τˆ ∧ γˆ ∧ τK ∧ T, P− a.s.
Dividing (6.34) by ε and taking limits as ε → 0, we may use Fatou’s theorem and
the expression (5.18) for ∂∂y (yF (z, y)) to obtain
wy(z0, y) ≥ −δ0E
[∫ T∧τˆ∧γˆ∧τK
0
e−rtUyt F (Z
z0
t , Y
y
t )
(
1− Y yt − σ
2
δ
1− Y yt
)
dt
]
.(6.36)
Now we let y ↑ y0 and use that P-a.s. the following limits hold
γˆ∗(z0, y) ↓ γˆ+∗ (z0, y0) ≥ γˆ∗(z0, y0),
τˆ∗(z0, y) ↑ τˆ∗(z0, y0) and τK(z0, y) ↓ τK(z0, y0).
In particular we notice that for the convergence of τˆ∗ we can use the same arguments
as those used above for the convergence of γˆε. Clearly
P(τK(z0, y0) > 0) = P(τˆ∗(z0, y0) > 0) = 1,
and by assumption, P(γˆ∗(z0, y0) > 0) > 0. Using again Fatou’s lemma, taking limits
in (6.36) the stopping time θ(z0, y) := (τˆ ∧ γˆ ∧ τK)(z0, y) converges to a stopping time
θ(z0, y0) > 0, P-a.s. Hence wy(z0, y0−) > 0, which contradicts the smooth-fit principle
proven in Lemma 6.5. In conclusion (z0, y0) must be regular for S ′2, i.e. (6.4) holds. 
1Notice that, due to the geometry of S ′2, (Zz0 , Y y0) can only enter S ′2 by hitting c2.
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7. Existence of a Nash equilibrium
Building on the results of the previous sections, we can prove the existence of a Nash
equilibrium for our game with incomplete information. We recall here that the two main
difficulties for such existence arise from the lack of uniform integrability of the stopping
payoffs and the fact that the problem is bi-dimensional. In the rest of this section we
make the next standing assumption.
Assumption 7.1. We assume σ
2
δ0
> 1.
The next result will allow us to circumvent the lack of uniform integrability and it
shows that the boundary c1 of S ′1 is always strictly positive.
Lemma 7.2. For every z ∈ R we have c1(z) > 0.
Proof. Arguing by contradiction we assume that there exists z0 ∈ R such that c1(z0) = 0.
Hence
(z0, y) /∈ S ′1 and (F (z0, y), y) /∈ S1 for all y ∈ (0, 1).(7.1)
Since F ( · , y) is increasing, properties of S1 studied in Section 4 imply that for fixed
h > 0 we may define a strip
C0(h) := {(z, y) ∈ R× (0, 1) | F (z0 − h, y) ≤ x ≤ F (z0, y)}
and C0(h) ∩ S1 = ∅.
In particular if we pick y ∈ (0, 1) and x = F (z0−h, y) then, assuming without loss of
generality that k > 0 (see (5.2)), we have τ∗ ≥ h, Px,y-a.s. The latter follows by the fact
that for all t ∈ [0, h] the couple (Xx,yt , Y yt ) lies in C0(h) because its joint distribution is
supported along a curve {(F (z0−h+kt, ζ), ζ), ζ ∈ (0, 1)} (see Remark 5.1). Notice that
for k < 0 and with x = F (z0− h, y), monotonicity of F ( · , y) and (7.1) imply τ∗ = +∞
Px,y-a.s.).
Theorem 3.2 gives
V (x, y) ≤ Ex,y
[
e−r(h∧τ∗)V (Xh∧τ∗ , Yh∧τ∗)
]
= Ex,y
[
e−rhV (Xh, Yh)
]
≤ Ex,y[e−rhXh] = F (z0 − h, y)Ey[e−δ0
∫ h
0 Yt dtMh],(7.2)
where Mh = exp(σWh − σ22 h). We aim at showing that for y sufficiently close to zero
we get
F (z0 − h, y)Ey
[
e−δ0
∫ h
0 Yt dtMh
]
≤ G1(F (z0 − h, y)) = F (z0 − h, y)−K
or equivalently
Θ(y) := F (z0 − h, y)
(
1− Ey
[
e−δ0
∫ h
0 Yt dtMh
])
≥ K.(7.3)
The latter and (7.2) lead to V (x, y) ≤ x−K, hence a contradiction.
Defining the probability measure P(σ) by
dP(σ)y
dPy
= Mh
by Girsanov’s theorem we have that W
(σ)
t = Wt−σt, t ≥ 0 is a Brownian motion under
P(σ)y . Moreover under the new measure Y evolves according to
Yt = y − δ0
σ
∫ t
0
Ys(1− Ys)dW (σ)s − δ0
∫ t
0
Ys(1− Ys)ds.
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From the above dynamics it follows immediately that E(σ)y (Yt) ≤ y for all t ≥ 0 and
(7.4) E(σ)y (Yt) ≥ y − δ0
∫ t
0
E(σ)y (Ys) ds ≥ y(1− δ0t).
Using the inequality 1− e−u ≥ u− u22 valid for u ≥ 0, we have
Θ(y) = F (z0 − h, y)Ey
[(
1− e−δ0
∫ h
0 Yt dt
)
Mh
]
≥ F (z0 − h, y)
(
δ0E(σ)y
[∫ h
0
Yt dt
]
− δ
2
0
2
E(σ)y
[∫ h
0
Yt dt
]2)
≥ F (z0 − h, y)
(
yδ0
∫ h
0
(1− δ0t) dt− δ
2
0h
2
E(σ)y
[∫ h
0
(Yt)
2 dt
])
,
where for the last inequality we used (7.4) and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. We aim at
showing that
E(σ)y
[∫ h
0
(Yt)
2 dt
]
≤ hy2.(7.5)
To see this, we observe that Y 2 is a supermartingale under the probability measure
P(σ). Indeed, applying Itoˆ’s formula we get
d(Y yt )
2 = −2δ0
σ
(Y yt )
2(1− Y yt )dW (σ)t − δ0(Y yt )2(1− Y yt )dt+
δ20
σ2
(Y yt )
2(1− Y yt )2dt,
and the drift part of the SDE is non-positive because σ
2
δ0
> 1. Thus (7.5) holds as
claimed.
Finally we obtain
Θ(y) ≥ δ0h y F (z0 − h, y)
(
1− δ0h
2
(1 + y)
)
.(7.6)
Recalling that y ∈ [0, 1], for h sufficiently small we have 1 > δ0h2 (1+C y). Moreover when
σ2/δ0 > 1 it is immediate to check that y F (z0 − h, y) → +∞ as y → 0 (see (5.5)). In
conclusion the right-hand side in (7.6) diverges, yielding the desired contradiction. 
We can now prove existence of a saddle point for our game.
Proposition 7.3. If k > 0 the pair (γ∗, τ∗) defined in Theorem 3.2 is a saddle point.
Proof. Since Theorem 3.2 guarantees the optimality of γ∗, i.e.
V (x, y) ≥Mx,y(τ, γ∗), for all τ ∈ T ,
it remains to prove the optimality of τ∗, that is
V (x, y) ≤Mx,y(τ∗, γ), for all γ ∈ T ,
Let z ∈ R be fixed and set x = F (z, y). Invoking Theorem 3.2 and observing that for
any fixed t > 0 and γ,
V (Xτ∗ , Yτ∗)1{τ∗≤t∧γ} = G1(Xτ∗)1{τ∗≤t∧γ}
we obtain
V (x, y) ≤Ex,y
[
e−r(t∧τ∗∧γ)V (Xt∧τ∗∧γ , Yt∧τ∗∧γ)
]
≤Ex,y
[
e−rτ∗G1(Xτ∗)1{τ∗≤t∧γ} + e
−rγG2(Xγ)1{γ<t∧τ∗}
]
+ Ex,y
[
e−rtV (Xt, Yt)1{t≤τ∗∧γ}
]
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for any stopping time γ.
We now prove that the last term of the expression above converges to zero as t→ +∞.
Notice first that c1 is non-decreasing (see Corollary 5.5) and therefore ζ 7→ (b1 ◦c1)(ζ) is
non-increasing due to Corollary 4.5. For t ≤ τ∗ we have Xxt = F (Zzt , Y yt ) ≤ b1(Yt), which
implies that Y yt ≥ c1(Zzt ) ≥ c1(z) after the change of variables. Then b1(Yt) ≤ (b1◦c1)(z)
and we have the uniform bound Xxt ≤ (b1◦c1)(z) =: az for t ≤ τ∗. Notice that c1(z) > 0
thanks to Lemma 7.2, so that we also have az < +∞.
Using such bound we get
Ex,y
[
e−rtV (Xt, Yt)1{t≤τ∗∧γ}
] ≤ G2 (az) e−rt → 0, as t→ 0.
Next, the monotone convergence theorem yields
V (x, y) ≤limt→+∞Ex,y
[
e−rτ∗G1(Xτ∗)1{τ∗≤t∧γ} + e
−rγG2(Xγ)1{γ<t∧τ∗}
]
=Ex,y
[
e−rτ∗G1(Xτ∗)1{τ∗≤γ} + e
−rγ∗G2(Xγ)1{γ<τ∗}
]
=Mx,y(τ∗, γ),
that is, τ∗ is optimal for the buyer. 
Let us now analyze the case k < 0, for which we prove existence of a Nash equilibrium
under stronger assumptions on the parameters. We start with an auxiliary lemma, which
will require the following assumption (recall also that σ2/δ0 > 1 by Assumption 7.1).
Assumption 7.4. We take r such that
δ0
σ2
(
δ0 + σ
2
2
)
< r <
(
δ0 + σ
2
2
)
.(7.7)
Notice that (7.7) indeed implies k < 0.
Lemma 7.5. Under Assumption 7.4 it holds that:
limt→∞e−rtF (z + kt, c1(z + kt)) = 0, ∀z ∈ R.
Proof. First note that
e−rtF (z + kt, c1(z + kt)) = ez+(k−r)t
(
1− c1(z + kt)
c1(z + kt)
)σ2
δ0
.
Then recall that c1(·) ≤ yK(·) (see (5.11)) and since k < 0 then c1(z + kt) → 0 as
t→ +∞. It is therefore sufficient to prove that as t→∞
1
c1(z + kt)
≤ c eαt,(7.8)
for some constants c > 0 and α < δ0
σ2
(r − k).
Define λa = inf{t > 0 |Yt ≤ a}. Let z ∈ R, y > c1(z) and x = F (z, y). Note that
since z → c1(z) is non-decreasing and k < 0, we have τ∗ ≥ λc1(z) Px,y-almost surely.
Therefore, for all t ≥ 0 Theorem 3.2 gives
V (x, y) ≤ Ex,y
[
e−r(t∧λc1(z))V
(
Xt∧λc1(z) , Yt∧λc1(z)
)](7.9)
= Ex,y
[
e−rtV (Xt, Yt)1{t<λc1(z)} + e
−rλc1(z)V
(
Xλc1(z) , c1(z)
)
1{λc1(z)≤t}
]
.
On the event {t < λc1(z)} we have Xt ≤ b1(Yt) and Yt ≥ c1(z), Px,y-a.s., so that
Xt ≤ (b1 ◦ c1)(z) =: az < +∞, Px,y-a.s. (as in the proof of Proposition 7.3). The latter
implies
e−rtV (Xt, Yt)1{t<λc1(z)} ≤ e
−rtXt1{t<λc1(z)} ≤ e
−rtaz1{t<λc1(z)}
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and hence
limt→0Ex,y
[
e−rtV (Xt, Yt)1{t<λc1(z)}
]
= 0, Px,y-a.s.
Taking limits in (7.9) as t→∞ and using monotone convergence, we deduce that
V (x, y) ≤Ex,y
[
e−rλc1(z)V
(
Xλc1(z) , c1(z)
)
1{λc1(z)<∞}
]
≤Ex,y
[
e−rλc1(z)Xλc1(z)1{λc1(z)<∞}
]
=Ey
[
e−rλc1(z)F (z + kλc1(z), c1(z))1{λc1(z)<∞}
]
= ez
(
1− c1(z)
c1(z)
)σ2
δ0
Ey
[
e(−r+k)λc1(z)1{λc1(z)<∞}
]
In order to compute the Laplace trasform of λc1(z) we need to recall the fundamental
solutions of LY f − (r − k)f = 0, where LY denotes the infinitesimal generator of the
diffusion Y . Letting ψ be the unique positive, increasing solution and φ the unique
positive, decreasing one, we have
ψ(y) = yβ(1− y)1−β and φ(y) = y1−β(1− y)β
where β = σ
2
δ0
+ 1 is the largest solution of
β(β − 1) = 2σ
2(r − k)
δ20
=
σ2
δ0
(
σ2
δ0
+ 1
)
.
In terms of φ the Laplace transform of λc1(z) reads (recall that y > c1(z))
Ey
[
e(−r+k)λc1(z)1{λc1(z)<∞}
]
=
y1−β(1− y)β
c1(z)1−β(1− c1(z))β .
In conclusion, for any z ∈ R and y > c1(z), taking x = F (z, y) we have (recall (5.6))
v(z, y) =V (x, y)(7.10)
≤ ez
(
1− c1(z)
c1(z)
)σ2
δ0 y1−β(1− y)β
c1(z)1−β(1− c1(z))β =
(1− y)
(1− c1(z))F (z, y).
Now we fix z ∈ R and pick a > 1 such that a c1(z) < 1. Since v(z+kt, a c1(z+kt)) ≥
F (z+ kt, a c1(z+ kt))−K for all t ≥ 0 we can use the latter and (7.10), replacing (z, y)
therein by
(
z + kt, a c1(z + kt)
)
, to estimate
−K ≤ (v − F )(z + kt, a c1(z + kt)) ≤ −(a− 1)c1(z + kt)
1− c1(z + kt) F (z + kt, a c1(z + kt)).
Simple algebra gives
1
c1(z + kt)
≤ c eαt
for some constant c > 0 depending on z, K and a, and with α = −kδ0/(σ2 − δ0). Now
Assumption 7.4 implies that −kδ0
σ2−δ0 <
δ0
σ2
(r − k) as required in (7.8). 
Proposition 7.6. Under Assumption 7.4 the pair (τ∗, γ∗) is a saddle point.
Proof. As in Proposition 7.3, we only have to prove the optimality of τ∗ and we argue in
a similar way. Let z ∈ R be fixed and set x = F (z, y), then as in the proof of Proposition
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7.3 we find
V (x, y) ≤Ex,y
[
e−r(t∧τ∗∧γ)V (Xt∧τ∗∧γ , Yt∧τ∗∧γ)
]
=Ex,y
[
e−rτ∗G1(Xτ∗)1{τ∗≤t∧γ} + e
−rγG2(Xγ , Yγ)1{γ<t∧τ∗}
]
(7.11)
+ Ex,y
[
e−rtV (Xt, Yt)1{t≤τ∗∧γ}
]
for any stopping time γ and any t. Under Px,y we have Xt = F (z+kt, Yt) and for t < τ∗
we have Yt ≥ c1(z + kt), which implies Xt ≤ F (z + kt, c1(z + kt)). The latter gives
Ex,y
[
e−rtV (Xt, Yt)1{t≤τ∗∧γ}
] ≤ e−rtF (z + kt, c1(z + kt)),
which goes to zero according to Lemma 7.5. Then taking limits as t→∞ in (7.11) and
using also monotone convergence we conclude the proof. 
8. Concluding remarks
Our approach relies on the ability to obtain a two-dimensional Markovian dynamic
for the stock price and the expected value of the dividend rate (given the observations
of the stock). This stems from fact that the dividend rate has a two-point distribution.
Similarly, if D has a discrete distribution taking n values, we can use filtering methods
to reduce the problem to a stopping game on a n-dimensional degenerate diffusion.
However, it should be clear at this point that a free boundary analysis of such problem
is likely to be extremely convoluted. An even more complex situation arises when the
dividend rate is allowed to take infinitely many values. In that case the dynamics
obtained via our filtering approach may easily lead to a formulation of the game which
is intractable with free boundary methods.
An alternative approach relies on the use of a Girsanov transformation. While it
falls outside the scope of the present paper to perform a fully rigorous analysis of this
method, we believe it may be useful for future research to outline the main ideas of this
approach and point out some questions that arise naturally.
Letting a process (βt)t≥0 be defined by
βt := Bt + σ
−1(r − δ0D)t, t ≥ 0,
we have that the stock price in (2.1) reads
St = S0exp
(
σβt − σ22 t
)
.(8.1)
Moreover, the process β is an F-Brownian motion for t ∈ [0, T ], under the measure Q
defined by
NT =
dQ
dP
∣∣∣∣
FT
:= exp
(
δ0D−r
σ βT +
(δ0D−r)2
2σ2
T
)
,(8.2)
for all T ≥ 0, where F is the (augmented) filtration generated by B and D.
Although it is not possible, in general, to perform the change of measure on F∞
(see, e.g., [22, pp. 192-193]), let us set this problem aside for now and assume that the
distribution of D is sufficiently ‘nice’ to allow the use of (8.2) in order to rewrite (1.3)
as
M(τ, γ) = EQ
[
Nτ∧γ
(
e−rτG1(Sτ )1{τ≤γ} + e−rγG2(Sγ)1{τ>γ}
)]
.
Now we define a process (Lt)t≥0 with Lt := EQ[Nt|FSt ]. Thanks to (8.2), using the fact
that D and β are independent under Q, and expressing β in terms of S (see (8.1)), we
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have Lt = fD(t, St, S0) for some function fD, depending on the specific distribution of
D. Then, the game’s payoff reads
M(τ, γ) = EQ
[
fD(τ ∧ γ, Sτ∧γ , S0)
(
e−rτG1(Sτ )1{τ≤γ} + e−rγG2(Sγ)1{τ>γ}
)]
(8.3)
where we note that fD can be computed explicitly in some cases
2.
The construction above holds for any law of D that allows to justify the change of
measure on F∞ (a seemingly non-trivial task). However, under the expectation, the
resulting game’s payoff depends explicitly on the initial value of the stock price S0.
One way to circumvent this issue would be to consider S0 as a ‘parameter’ in the game
formulation (8.3), and treat it independently of the initial value of the process S. That
is, we would fix an arbitrary s¯0 and study the game with payoff
EQ
[
fD(τ ∧ γ, Sτ∧γ , s¯0)
(
e−rτG1(Sτ )1{τ≤γ} + e−rγG2(Sγ)1{τ>γ}
)]
,(8.4)
where the process S starts from an arbitrary point S0, possibly different from s¯0. Now,
for each s¯0 one must solve the Dynkin game with payoff as in (8.4), which remains
a challenging task due to the (generally) convoluted expression of fD. Moreover, the
shapes of the continuation and stopping region need to be studied not only as functions
of time but also as functions of the parameter s¯0.
It is interesting to notice that the approach outlined above corresponds to the study
of pre-commitment strategies in the closely related literature on time-inconsistent con-
trol/stopping problems. (The interested reader may consult, e.g., [6] and references
therein, for a recent detailed study on a class of time-inconsistent stopping problems
where time inconsistency stems from a ‘parametric’ dependence of the gain function on
the starting point of the process, i.e., the analogue of our fD(·, ·, S0)). To the best of our
knowledge, time-inconsistent Dynkin games have never been addressed in the literature.
Moreover, there seems to be no clear consensus, as to whether the pre-commitment strat-
egy is conceptually the best way forward in time-inconsistent stochastic optimisation
problems. This interesting question is left for future research.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 3.2
The main idea of the proof is to approximate our game by a sequence of games
with bounded stopping payoffs indexed by n ∈ N. For each approximating problem
we can apply the results of [16] regarding existence of the value and of a saddle point.
Eventually we pass to the limit as n → ∞ to obtain the existence of the value for the
game with unbounded payoffs.
For n ≥ 1 let us define the functions G(n)i (x) = Gi(x ∧ n), i = 1, 2. Next for τ, γ ∈ T
let us introduce the the associated payoff
M (n)x,y (τ, γ) = Ex,y[e−rτG
(n)
1 (Xτ )1{τ≤γ} + e
−rγG(n)2 (Xγ)1{γ<τ}].(A.1)
According to Theorem 2.1. in [16], the game with payoff (A.1) has a value, i.e.
V (n)(x, y) = sup
τ
inf
γ
M (n)x,y (τ, γ) = inf
γ
sup
τ
M (n)x,y (τ, γ).
Moreover, the stopping times
τn = inf{t ≥ 0 |V (n)(Xt, Yt) = G(n)1 (Xt)},
γn = inf{t ≥ 0 |V (n)(Xt, Yt) = G(n)2 (Xt)},
2For example, in the simple case of D ∼ N(0, 1) we have
fD(t, s, s0) = (1 + t(δ0/σ)
2)−1/2exp
[
g(t, s, s0)/(1 + t(δ0/σ)
2)
]
,
with g(t, s, s0) :=
1
2t
q2(t, s, s0)− t2 [ rσ − 1t q(t, s, s0)]2/(1+ t(δ0/σ)2) and q(t, s, s0) := σ−1 ln(s/s0)+σt/2.
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form a Nash equilibrium. Since
G
(n)
1 (x) ≤ V (n)(x, y) ≤ sup
τ
M (n)x,y (τ,+∞) ≤ (n−K)+
and G
(n)
1 (x) = (n−K)+ for x ≥ n, then V (n)(x, y) = G(n)1 (x) for (x, y) ∈ [n,+∞)×[0, 1].
The latter implies that
{(x, y) | V (n)(x, y) = G(n)2 (x)} ⊂ [0, n]× [0, 1] = {(x, y) | G2(x) = G(n)2 (x)}
and therefore
γn = inf{t ≥ 0 |V (n)(Xt, Yt) = G2(Xt)}.
Concerning the value of the approximating game, it is easy to check that Lemma 3.1
holds for V (n) with the same proof. Moreover the sequence M
(n)
x,y (τ, γ) is non-decreasing
in n and it is bounded from above by Mx,y(τ, γ). Hence the sequence (V
(n))n≥1 is
non-decreasing in n with
V (n)(x, y) ≤ V (x, y) ≤ V (x, y) and V∞(x, y) := limn→∞V (n)(x, y)(A.2)
for all (x, y) ∈ R+ × [0, 1]. In particular V (n) ≤ V implies
γn ≥ γ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0 |V (Xt, Yt) = G2(Xt)} for all n ≥ 1.
Since V (n) is non-decreasing in n then γn is non-increasing and we set γ∞ := limn→∞γn.
Now we aim at showing that V∞ ≥ V so that (A.2) implies V = V and therefore the
value exists and it coincides with V∞. For all τ ∈ T , we have
M (n)x,y (τ, γn) =Ex,y
[
e−rτG(n)1 (Xτ )1{τ≤γn} + e
−rγnG(n)2 (Xγn)1{γn<τ}
]
=Ex,y
[
e−rτG1(Xτ )1{τ≤γn} + e
−rγnG2(Xγn)1{γn<τ}
]
− Ex,y
[
e−rτ (Xτ − n)1{Xτ≥n}1{τ≤γn}
]
.
Observe that
0 ≤ Ex,y[e−rτ (Xτ − n)1{Xτ≥n}1{τ≤γn}] ≤ Ex,y[e−rτXτ1{Xτ≥n}](A.3)
and recall that Ex,y[e−rτXτ ] ≤ x by (2.5). Using dominated convergence in (A.3) we
obtain
limn→∞Ex,y[e−rτ (Xτ − n)1{Xτ≥n}1{τ≤γn}] = 0.
On the other hand, Fatou’s Lemma implies
lim inf
n→∞ Ex,y
[
e−rτG1(Xτ )1{τ≤γn} + e
−rγnG2(Xγn)1{γn<τ}
]
≥Ex,y
[
e−rτG1(Xτ )1{τ≤γ∞} + e
−rγ∞G2(Xγ∞)1{γ∞<τ}
]
= Mx,y(τ, γ∞).
Collecting the above limits we deduce that
lim inf
n→∞ M
(n)
x,y (τ, γn) ≥Mx,y(τ, γ∞).(A.4)
Now, for ε > 0, let τε be such that
Mx,y(τε, γ∞) ≥ sup
τ
Mx,y(τ, γ∞)− ε.
Using optimality of γn in the approximating problem, and (A.4) we obtain
V∞(x, y) = limn→∞V (n)(x, y) = limn→∞ sup
τ
M (n)x,y (τ, γn) ≥ lim infn→∞ M
(n)
x,y (τε, γn)
≥Mx,y(τε, γ∞) ≥ sup
τ
Mx,y(τ, γ∞)− ε ≥ V (x, y)− ε.
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Finally, letting ε→ 0 and recalling (A.2), we obtain
V (x, y) ≥ V∞(x, y) ≥ V (x, y),
and hence the existence of the value V := V∞. As a byproduct we also obtain that γ∞
is optimal for player 2, that is
V (x, y) = sup
τ
Mx,y(τ, γ∞).
Next we want to prove optimality of γ∗ and super/sub-martingale properties of V .
For all n and any τ ∈ T we have (see [16, Thm. 2.1.])
V (n)(x, y) ≥Ex,y[e−r(τ∧γn)V (n)(Xτ∧γn , Yτ∧γn)]
=Ex,y[e−rτV (n)(Xτ , Yτ )1{τ≤γn}] + Ex,y[e
−rγnG2(Xγn)1{τ>γn}]
≥Ex,y[e−rτV (n)(Xτ , Yτ )1{τ≤γn}] + Ex,y[e−rγnV (Xγn , Yγn)1{τ>γn}]
=Ex,y[e−r(τ∧γn)V (Xτ∧γn , Yτ∧γn)]
+ Ex,y[e−rτ (V (n)(Xτ , Yτ )− V (Xτ , Yτ ))1{τ≤γn}]
where in the second inequality we used that G2 ≥ V . Now we take limits as n → ∞.
Recalling that V (n) ≤ V , that 0 ≤ V (x, y) ≤ x+ ε0 and that e−rτXτ is integrable, the
second term in the last expression above converges to zero by dominated convergence.
Moreover, Fatou’s Lemma yields,
(A.5) V (x, y) ≥ Ex,y[e−r(τ∧γ∞)V (Xτ∧γ∞ , Yτ∧γ∞)].
Since τ ∈ T was arbitrary the process e−r(t∧γ∞)V (Xt∧γ∞ , Yt∧γ∞), t ≥ 0 is a super-
martingale. Noticing that γ∞ ≥ γ∗ and choosing τ = ρ ∧ γ∗ in (A.5) for some ρ ∈ T ,
we see that also the process e−r(t∧γ∗)V (Xt∧γ∗ , Yt∧γ∗), t ≥ 0 is a super-martingale as
claimed. As it is a non-negative super-martingale, Fatou’s lemma gives
V (x, y) ≥ lim inf
t→∞ Ex,y[e
−r(t∧γ∗)V (Xt∧γ∗ , Yt∧γ∗)] ≥ Ex,y[e−rγ∗V (Xγ∗ , Yγ∗)]
hence the super-martingale is closed.
Finally, we prove that γ∗ is optimal for the seller, i.e. player 2. We have
V (x, y) ≥ Ex,y[e−r(τ∧γ∗)V (Xτ∧γ∗ , Yτ∧γ∗)]
= Ex,y[e−rτV (Xτ , Yτ )1{τ≤γ∗}] + Ex,y[e
−rγ∗G2(Xγ∗)1{τ>γ∗}]
≥ Ex,y[e−rτG1(Xτ )1{τ≤γ∗}] + Ex,y[e−rγ∗G2(Xγ∗)1{τ>γ∗}]
= Mx,y(τ, γ∗)
Taking the supremum over τ gives the optimality of strategy γ∗ for player 2.
It remains to prove the sub-martingale property. Let us denote
(A.6) S(n)1 =
{
(x, y) ∈ R+ × [0, 1] | V (n)(x, y) = G(n)1 (x)
}
,
the stopping region of player 1. Notice that an analogous set can be defined relatively
to V and G1 (see (4.2)). In Section 4 properties of S1 are proven in Lemma 4.2 by using
continuity and monotonicity of V . The same methodology can be applied to V (n) to
prove analogous properties for S(n)1 . To be precise it is worth noticing that (4.8) holds
for V (n) provided that x ≤ x′ ≤ n therein. The rest of (iii) in Lemma 4.2 follows by
recalling that [n,+∞) × [0, 1] ⊆ S1. The analogy holds with Corollary 4.5 as well. In
particular there exists a non-increasing lower-semi-continuous map b
(n)
1 : [0, 1] → R+
such that for x ≥ K it holds (x, y) ∈ S(n)1 ⇔ x ≥ b(n)1 (y).
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Observe that if (x, y) ∈ S(n+1)1 is such that x < n, we have
V (n)(x, y) ≤ V (n+1)(x, y) = G(n+1)1 (x) = G1(x) = G(n)1 (x),
which implies (x, y) ∈ S(n)1 . Together with the fact that [n,∞) × [0, 1] ⊂ S(n)1 , this
implies that S(n+1)1 ⊂ S(n)1 . By the same arguments, we prove that S(n)1 ⊂ S1. We
deduce that the sequence b
(n)
1 is non-decreasing and that τn is a non-decreasing sequence
of stopping times such that τ∞ := limnτn ≤ τ∗. Moreover, if (x, y) ∈ R+ × [0, 1)
is such that x < b1(y), then V (x, y) > G1(x) and, for sufficiently large n, we have
V (n)(x, y) > G1(x) = G
(n)
1 (x), implying that x < b
(n)
1 (y). We deduce that b
(n)
1 converges
to b1 on [0, 1) pointwise.
Now, we prove that τ∞ = τ∗. Since τ∞ ≤ τ∗, it is sufficient to show that the equality
holds Px,y-almost surely on {τ∞ < ∞}. For (x, y) ∈ S1 the claim is trivial. Fix
(x, y) /∈ S1 and ω ∈ {τ∞ <∞}. Since the sequence (b(n)1 )n∈N is non-decreasing then for
fixed m ∈ N and any n ≥ m we have b(n)1 (Yτn(ω)) ≥ b(m)1 (Yτn(ω)). The latter implies
lim inf
n→∞ b
(n)
1 (Yτn(ω)) ≥ b(m)1 (Yτ∞(ω))
by using that Yτn(ω)→ Yτ∞(ω) as well. Taking the supremum over m in the right-hand
side of the above expression and recalling that b
(m)
1 ↑ b1 pointwise we conclude
lim inf
n→∞ b
(n)
1 (Yτn(ω)) ≥ b1(Yτ∞(ω)).(A.7)
Since Xτn ≥ b1(Xτn), Px,y-a.s. for all n ∈ N, using continuity of paths and (A.7), we
also find
Xτ∞ = limn→∞Xτn ≥ lim infn→∞ b
(n)
1 (Yτn) ≥ b1(Yτ∞) Px,y-a.s.
which implies τ∞ ≥ τ∗, Px,y-a.s. as requested.
Finally we notice that the process e−r(t∧τn)V (n)(Xt∧τn , Yt∧τn) is a sub-martingale for
all n. Since τn ≤ τn+p for all n, p ≥ 0, we deduce that
V (n+p)(x, y) ≤ Ex,y[e−r(t∧τn)V (n+p)(Xt∧τn , Yt∧τn)].
Letting p→∞, monotone convergence implies that
V (x, y) ≤ Ex,y[e−r(t∧τn)V (Xt∧τn , Yt∧τn)]
for all n. Taking n→∞ and recalling that e−r(t∧τn)V (Xt∧τn , Yt∧τn) ≤ sups∈[0,t] e−rsXs ∈
L1(Px,y), bounded convergence implies
V (x, y) ≤ Ex,y[e−r(t∧τ∗)V (Xt∧τ∗ , Yt∧τ∗)].
The above result and the Markov property imply that e−r(t∧τ∗)V (Xt∧τ∗ , Yt∧τ∗) is a
sub-martingale as claimed.
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 6.2
The proof is more easily carried out considering the boundaries c1 and c2 rather than
b1 and b2. However we incur no loss of generality thanks to the equivalence of the
problem formulation with respect to the coordinates (x, y) and (z, y). We provide a full
argument for k > 0 but a completely symmetric proof holds for k < 0.
Since c1 is non-decreasing and Y is non-degenerate at all points of (0, 1), the law of
iterated logarithm implies that τˆ∗ = τˇ , P-a.s. Similarly if (Z, Y ) hits the line yK(·) from
above then it will immediately cross it downwards.
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For the same result relative to the boundary c2 we repeat the steps in [5, Cor. 8]. In
particular let us introduce some notation
γˆε := inf{t > 0 |Yt ≥ c2(Zt) + ε}, γˆδε := inf{t > δ |Yt ≥ c2(Zt) + ε}(B.1)
γˇε := inf{t > 0 |Yt > c2(Zt) + ε}, γˇδε := inf{t > δ |Yt > c2(Zt) + ε}(B.2)
so that γˆ∗ = γˆ0 and γˇ = γˇ0. We have γˆ+ := limε→0γˆε = γˇ and
γˆδ0 ≤ γˆδ+ := limε→0γˆδε = γˇδ0 .
Assume that for any (z, y) ∈ RK we have
Pz,y(γˇδ0 > t) ≤ Pz,y(γˆδ0 > t)(B.3)
so that γˇδ0 = γˆ
δ
0 , Pz,y-a.s. Then
γˇ = limε→0γˆε = limε→0limδ→0γˆδε =limδ→0limε→0γˆ
δ
ε = limδ→0γˇ
δ
0 = limδ→0γˆ
δ
0 = γˆ0 = γˆ∗
where the last limit is easily verified by definition of γˆδ0 and we could swap the limits
because γˆδε is non-decreasing in both δ and ε.
Now it remains to verify (B.3). We start by noticing that any interval of the form
(δ, t) may be decomposed into the union of countably many intervals over which c2 is
either strictly increasing or flat. Consider the latter, i.e. let I ⊂ R be an interval such
that c2(ζ) = y0 for ζ ∈ I and a fixed y0 ∈ (0, 1). Fix also (z, y) ∈ RK , then it is
immediate to check that on the event {γˆ∗ ∈ I} one has γˆ∗ = γˇ, Pz,y-a.s., because Y
immediately crosses y0 after reaching it. This in particular implies that
Pz,y (Ys ≤ c2(Zs), ∀s ∈ I) = Pz,y (Ys < c2(Zs), ∀s ∈ I) .(B.4)
Next we fix h0 ∈ (0, δ/2) so that for h ∈ (0, h0) we have c2(Zs) ≤ c2(Zs+h), Pz,y-a.s.,
because c2 and Z are non-decreasing. Moreover the inequality is strict whenever c2 is
strictly increasing. Hence, the latter consideration and (B.4) imply
Pz,y(γˇδ0 > t) =Pz,y (Ys ≤ c2(Zs), ∀s ∈ (δ, t])
≤Pz,y (Ys < c2(Zs+h), ∀s ∈ (δ, t])
=Pz,y (Yr−h < c2(Zr), ∀r ∈ (δ + h, t+ h])
≤Pz,y (Yr−h < c2(Zr), ∀r ∈ (δ + h0, t])
≤Py (Yr−h < c2(z + kr), ∀r ∈ (δ + h0, t]) ,
where in the last expression we have expressed Z explicitly so that it can be treated
effectively as a ‘time’ variable.
We now denote by pY and mY the probability transition density and the speed
measure of Y , respectively. Then by using the Markov property of Y we obtain
Pz,y(γˇδ0 > t) ≤Py (Yr−h < c2(z + kr), ∀r ∈ (δ + h0, t])
=Ey
[
PYδ/2−h
(
Yr−δ/2 < c2(z + kr), ∀r ∈ (δ + h0, t]
)]
=
∫ 1
0
pY (δ/2− h, y, ξ)Pξ
(
Yr−δ/2 < c2(z + kr), ∀r ∈ (δ + h0, t]
)
mY (dξ).
Scheffe´’s theorem (see page 224 in [4]) guarantees that
limh→0
∫ 1
0
|pY (δ/2− h, y, ξ)− pY (δ/2, y, ξ)|mY (dξ) = 0
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thus implying that taking limits as h→ 0 we obtain
Pz,y(γˇδ0 > t) ≤
∫ 1
0
pY (δ/2, y, ξ)Pξ
(
Yr−δ/2 < c2(z + kr), ∀r ∈ (δ + h0, t]
)
mY (dξ)
=Py (Yr < c2(z + kr), ∀r ∈ (δ + h0, t]) = Pz,y(γˆδ+h00 > t).
Letting now h0 → 0 we find (B.3) as claimed, because it is easy to verify that γˆδ+h00 ↓ γˆδ0 .
Appendix C. Game with complete information: summary of results
In this appendix we provide a short summary of existing results concerning the stop-
ping regions in the game call option problem with perfect information, i.e. when y is
either 0 or 1. The material below is based on results contained in [35], for y = 1, and
[17], for y = 0.
We recall Mx,y(τ, γ) as in (1.3) and emphasise that here y = {0, 1}. Denote by V∞
the value of the optimal stopping problem for the buyer when there is no possible seller’s
cancellation (i.e. when γ = +∞):
V∞(x, y) := sup
τ
Mx,y(τ,+∞)
and by VK the value of the problem when γ = γK , i.e. the hitting time of {K} by X:
VK(x, y) := sup
τ
Mx,y(τ, γK).
We also define the critical dividend levels δ1 < δ2 by
δ1 := inf{δ > 0 | limx↓K VK(x, 1)− ε
x−K ≤ 1} and δ2 := inf{δ > 0 |V∞(K, 1) < ε}.
For the process X we recall that the fundamental solutions of
σ2
2 x
2f ′′(x) + (r − δ)xf ′(x)− rf(x) = 0, x > 0
are ψ(x) = xλ1 and φ(x) = xλ2 , with ψ increasing (notice that λ1 > 1) and φ decreasing,
and where λ2 < λ1 solve
σ2
2 λ
2 + (r − δ0 − σ
2
2
)λ− r = 0.
The next Proposition summarises results of [35] and [17, Sec. 5.1].
Proposition C.1. The following four cases hold
• Case 1: If ε0 ≥ K we have
– S2 ∩ {y = 0} = S2 ∩ {y = 1} = ∅,
– S1 ∩ {y = 0} = ∅ and S1 ∩ {y = 1} = [ λ1λ1−1K,+∞).• Case 2: If ε0 < K and δ0 ≥ δ2 we have
– S2 ∩ {y = 0} = [K,+∞) and S2 ∩ {y = 1} = ∅.
– S1 ∩ {y = 0} = ∅ and S1 ∩ {y = 1} = [ λ1λ1−1K,+∞).• Case 3: If ε0 < K and δ1 ≤ δ0 < δ2 we have
– S2 ∩ {y = 0} = [K,+∞) and S2 ∩ {y = 1} = {K}.
– S1 ∩ {y = 0} = ∅ and S1 ∩ {y = 1}| = [α0,+∞), where α0 is the unique
solution of(
α0 −K
α0
λ1 − 1
)
αλ1−λ20 −
(
α0 −K
α0
λ2 − 1
)
Kλ1−λ2 =
ε0
K
(λ1 − λ2)αλ1−10 K1−λ2 .
• Case 4: If ε0 < K and 0 < δ0 < δ1 we have
– S2 ∩ {y = 0} = [K,+∞) and S2 ∩ {y = 1} = [K,β1]
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– S1 ∩{y = 0} = ∅ and S1 ∩{y = 1} = [α1,+∞) where (α1, β1) is the unique
solution of the system of equations
(
α1−K
α1
λ1 − 1
)
αλ1−λ21 −
(
α1−K
α1
λ2 − 1
)
βλ1−λ21 =
β1−K+ε0
β1
(λ1 − λ2)αλ1−11 β1−λ21(
β1−K+ε0
β1
λ1 − 1
)
βλ1−λ21 −
(
β1−K+ε0
β1
λ2 − 1
)
αλ1−λ21 =
α1−K
α1
(λ1 − λ2)βλ1−11 α1−λ21
For all the above cases, the pair (γ∗, τ∗) defined in Theorem 3.2 is not a saddle point if
y = 0, and is a saddle point if y = 1.
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